Ordering address for publications:

IFGK c/o Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Pf 2110, D-32378 Minden.

Fax +49-571 23019

Email: soziale_verteidigung@bionic.zerberus.de

Payments by transfer to account number 140 124 88

at the Kreissparkasse Rhein-Hunsrück, BLZ 560 517 90

Contact address:

Institut für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktlösung e.V.

Institute For Peace Work And Nonviolent Settlement of Conflict

Hauptstr.35, D-55491 Wahlenau

Tel: +49-6543 980096 or -30 693 7880

E-mail: Institut_fgk@bionic.zerberus.de

Content:

Tabels:

Diagrams:

In this study we examine ten cases of nonviolent intervention in violent conflicts. Our aim is to be able to state more accurately what the specific contribution of a nonviolent approach to de-escalation and conflict transformation might be.

In the first section we describe the understanding of conflict used by the nonviolent actors, which leads as a consequence to an original approach to, and way of acting in, conflicts. We define the three basic peace strategies of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding and justify the need to combine them. We relate methods of nonviolent action to these peace strategies. One of our theses is that, through a flexible combination of nonviolent methods, peace strategies can effectively contribute to de-escalation and conflict transformation.

To justify this thesis, in section 3 we compare theoretical models of conflict escalation and de-escalation and present a summarised overview. They reflect the whole process which we understand - following Lederach - to be one of conflict transformation. The case studies are sorted according to this escalation and de-escalation scheme.

In order to be able to grasp the de-escalating effect of nonviolent intervention more accurately, we develop a "conflict pyramid" based on Galtung's conflict triangle and Glasl's step model. This allows the representation of the "escalation track" of a specific conflict and makes it possible to predict which intervention methods seem to be necessary and helpful for a de-escalating treatment of the conflict. Here we are guided by Fisher's concept and develop a "de-escalation track" for the main direction of the intervention on the individual escalation steps. In the empirical section we transfer the case studies to this model and show to what extent the specific interventions have a de-escalating influence on the conflict in question as a whole or on parts of it (segments). In our opinion it is important to determine the levels and social segments which the intervention affects in order to be able to assess the scope of nonviolent interventions. In this chapter we offer for discussion a first attempt at such an assessment.

An important result of the empirical analysis is the observation that nonviolent interventions do not automatically combine the peace strategies. More common are action-based interventions which hope to reach their goals through a previously agreed action and essentially use methods of one of the peace strategies. In contrast, there are process-orientated interventions which primarily aim to affect the conflict dynamic and which develop suitable methods during the project itself. This is usually a combination of the three peace strategies. The latter projects developed a greater de-escalating effect on the conflict than the action-based projects.

The specific difference between nonviolent interventions and other forms of intervention lies in the rejection of the use of physical means of violence. In place of physical force, methods of social contact are used, both to prevent hostile behaviour and to encourage more constructive behaviour. The main task of those intervening consists of initially establishing such contact to all possible parties to the conflict, and then accompanying the de-escalation process through contributions appropriate to the level of de-escalation.

The examination of further criteria for successful intervention showed two to be particularly important for our case studies: The first is the category of "cost awareness" for the conflict parties. The second is the dividing of the conflict players into the three levels developed by Lederach. A hypothesis to be tested further is whether the de-escalating effect of an intervention depends on the extent to which a willingness on the part of the conflict parties to change exists (or can be developed) and on the number of levels of actors in the conflict who can be involved in the de-escalation process.

2 Introduction [*]

In this investigation we systematise ten cases of nonviolent intervention in violent conflicts. Our aim is to determine and explain more accurately the specific contribution of an explicitly nonviolent approach to, and methods for, a possible conflict de-escalation or resolution. We use the concept of intervention following Czempiel[1] as being the appearance of an initially uninvolved party in a conflict which is already at a relatively advanced stage of escalation. By "intervention through nonviolent action" we mean the conscious use of nonviolent methods by which the actors expect a de-escalating effect on the conflict. What specifically justifies the choice of nonviolent actors?

The first working hypothesis is that nonviolent actors have a specific understanding of conflict between groups[2] and that from this an original approach and method follows. In this understanding, conflicts are viewed as injust situations maintained by the conflict parties - and by the non-acting environment. The conflict analysis includes determining the facts causing the injustice and the proportions contributed by the conflict parties and possibly also by persons or groups who are, on the surface, not involved. A full analysis includes the question of the actor's own co-responsibility for the injustice. The actions to be taken are developed from a perspective orientated on the subjective truth of the affected parties, usually the victims of violence, but, by also including the subjective truth of the other side, does not remain at the level of identification.[3] We suspect that such an understanding of conflict leads to a great sensitivity for situations of injustice and to the willingness to become active out of self-responsibility and at great personal risk, even without the mandate of international or state authorities. The treatment of the conflict is concerned less with establishing who is guilty and to pillory them, and much more with ending an unbearable, injust situation by supporting the conflict parties to see the conflict as a common problem (i.e., objective injustice) instead of as an irreconcilable contradiction of aims and interests.

How is such a complex understanding of conflict expressed in the practical treatment of conflict? Our second working hypothesis is that nonviolent actors have to combine very different methods, if they wish to dissuade the conflict parties from acting destructively, and motivate and perhaps even enable them to take part in a common approach to the conflict. The task of ending destructive conflict behaviour and moving towards conflict resolution is one of the central challenges of securing peace per se. It concerns the whole international community and its apparatus and has become more and more urgent in recent years. In the Agenda for Peace, the General Secretary of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali described a system encompassing civilian and military means to be deployed in separate strategies[4] at different times. Experiences with nonviolent interventions give the initial impression that strategies of conflict treatment should be combined. In this study we examine the question whether this impression is confirmed and whether a transfer of experiences gained with nonviolent interventions could contribute to a general optimisation of the instruments for dealing with conflict. In the following chapter we describe the strategies of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, which we believe to be of crucial importance, and relate them to the current problem and discussion.

---

[*] We would like to thank thte following persons for encouragment, criticism, suggestions and advice on improving the draft of this text: Christoph Besemer, Prof. Dr. Andreas Buro, Anne Dietrich, Reinhard Eismann, Christine M. Merkel, Wilhelm Nolte, Norbert Ropers, Prof. Dr. Dieter Senghaas and Prof Dr. Gert Sommer.

[1] Czempiel defines intervention thus: "Intervention is usually only understood to be an armed intervention by a foreign state. This extreme case is extended to include all other not violent levels of effect up to the exertion of influence. At the same time the 'internal affairs' of a state are restricted to its system of rule. Even if the intervention strategies have been extended, refined and de-militarised, they have retained their ultimate target: a country's system of rule." Czempiel 1994, p. 403.

[2] We focus here on interpersonal conflicts.

[3] Described here following Goss-Mayr 1981, p. 88 ff.

[4] Boutros Ghali 1992 and 1995.

Following that, we locate the three strategies within the framework of conflict theory. In doing so we concentrate the analysis of conflict and interventions on the processes of escalation and de-escalation and have taken further aspects, such as power, violence, conflict history and formation of the parties into consideration only when they contribute to the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation processes.[5] Finally, ten cases of nonviolent intervention are transferred into this analytical framework.

The actors in the interventions are the teams active on the scene, action groups and their supporting organisations or coalitions. They can be seen as part of the developing international civil society, which is increasingly demanding the right to participate in international politics, and at the same time is putting increasing efforts in this field.[6] The cases chosen show a wide range in terms of actors, their organisation and approaches. Our focus in this work is on determining and sorting the activities according to their effectiveness on the conflict process. A further important question, which we raise but cannot answer here, is whether relationships between success of the actitvities and particular qualifications of the actors can be established. In the longer term this could lead to identifiy a typology of coalitions, organisational structures etc, which are particularly suited to influencing conflict parties constructively. Conceivably, a differentiation according to the type of conflict may be necessary. However, all these questions are not part of this investigation.

2.1 Course of the investigation, choice of cases, basic sources

Initially we compare conflict theoretical models of escalation and de-escalation and combine them in an overview. This overview depicts the basic pattern of the whole process which we understand, following Lederach, as the transformation of a conflict.[7] We place the escalation process, which is to be overcome through de-escalating actions or interventions, in the centre of the transformation process. The empirical cases will be located in this framework.

We have chosen from a pool of 29 cases of nonviolent interventions (and attempts) 10 cases, which are described briefly below.[8] They include the most important projects developed out of discussions and action of the international nonviolent movement inspired by Gandhi since the second world war (cases 1-4), and some of the most spectacular current attempts to end or prevent war through mass actions or presence in war zones (cases 5, 6 and 8). The attempts to intervene in the civil war in former Yugoslavia have set off an intense process of learning and adjustment, which is expressed in cases 8, 9 and 10. The EM-

---

[5] Cf. Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993 on the difficulties of dealing with international social conflicts, pp 13-24, and Ropers 1995 on ethnopolititical conflicts.

[6] "We consider civil society to be a network of organisations and informal coalitions that is suited to act as adversary and counterpart to the apparatus of state ... coupled with the question of effective participation rights and the conditions of such participation." (Kößler/Melber 1993, p 93).

[7] Lederach 1994, p. 34 ff.

[8] Müller 1993, Büttner 1995.

PSA Programme (case 7) is a special case, in as far as no other intervention was so inherently part of an internally controlled process of conflict management. In detail, we examine:

1. 1964-1972: Nagaland Peace Mission: establishment of a ceasefire, its observation, and the strengthening of peaceful forces in the north-eastern Indian state of Nagaland.
2. 1968-1969: Shanti Sena deployment ("peace army") in communal riots in Ahmedabad in Gujarat state (western India): stabilisation of the de-escalation after the riots, reconciliation and repatriation of those displaced by the riots.
3. 1972-1974: Cyprus Resettlement Project (CRP): negotiation and implementation of a project to repatriate exiles, and sustainable de-escalation during the violent escalation of the conflict through the Turkish invasion.
4. 1983-1996: Guatemala Project of Peace Brigades International (PBI): Protection of grassroots groups from state violence against civilians, promotion of contacts and dialogue between the conflict parties, encouragement and facilitation of oppositional political work through the presence of a voluntary team.
5. 1990-1991: Initiative Frieden am Golf (Peace in the Gulf) (IFAG): journeys into Iraq and to Bagdad to avert the escalation of the Gulf war through physical solidarity with the probable victims of the war.
6. 1990-1991: Gulf Peace Team (GPT): Establishment of peace camps along the borders of the enemy states in order to avert the escalation of the Gulf war through physical interposition.
7. 1992-1994: Ecumenical Monitoring Programme for South Africa (EMPSA): Observation and reporting by observers on the violence, the transformation process and the elections in South Africa.
8. August 1993: Mir Sada ("Peace Now"): (interrupted) journey by several thousand people from Split to Sarajevo to encourage a ceasefire, practise solidarity with the local population, and bring food.
9. November/December 1993: Sjeme Mira ("Seeds of Peace"): journey to Mostar to demonstrate through physical presence solidarity with the victims on all sides, and if possible encourage a ceasefire.
10. 1994-1996: Balkan Peace Team International (BPTI) in Croatia: protection of human rights, support for democracy and civilian society and for peaceful approaches to the conflict through the presence and activities of volunteer teams in the area.

2.2 The peace strategies in an integrated concept for dealing with conflict

Galtung has laid the theoretical and terminological foundation for the classification of the activities of third parties in conflicts by distinguishing between peacekeeping as the dissociation of the conflict parties, peacemaking as a problem solving approach and peacebuilding as associative peace structure.[9] In his paper "Three approaches to peace", Johan Galtung defines the three peace strategies: "The answers ... lead in the direction of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding... .Together they formulate a general theory of the three possibilities of maintaining peace. Keeping the opponents apart, negotiating a political solution and, finally, tying the adversaries into something that one could call a peace system."[10] In our opinion, the whole range of methods which support a more constructive treatment of the conflict can be summarised into these "three strategies"

In the present paper we use these terms in a civil, non-military sense. We thus find ourselves in conflict with the current trend, which increasingly places the three peace strategies in a

---

[9] Galtung 1982, pp. 50-80.
[10] Galtung 1982, p. 8.

military context. Here we mean, for example, Boutros Ghali's combination of peacemaking with the use of military force in the "Agenda for Peace" or the discussion on so-called "robust peacekeeping", in which the aims - and thereby also civil measures - should under certain conditions be achieved militarily:[11] This use of language makes it - especially in the case of peacemaking - impossible to differentiate whether interventions by military force or negotiated peacekeeping with minimum use of violence for self-defence is meant. The distinction between civil and militarily supported peace strategies is important, because this trend does not in our opinion do justice to the civil potential of peace strategies, but instead hinders them. The following indicates the tradition in which we see our approach.

Terminologically we orientate ourselves on Galtung's system of peace strategies. Galtung abstained from assigning civil or military means to the individual strategies.[12] In practice it is possible to show that since the 19th century the peace churches, and above all the Quakers, developed methods which would now be termed peacemaking and peacekeeping and which are fully civilian-based.[13] Thus we can observe a civil practice in the peace strategies, and on the other hand a theory that leaves the choice of methods open. Our work aims to contribute to the evaluation of this civilian-based practice - including far more than the peace churches' involvement - and the inclusion of the civilian-based potential of the peace strategies in theoretical analysis. The term "peace strategies" is used here to mean the three strategies of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding as they were used until a few years ago to describe primarily civil strategies. Peacekeeping allowed the use of weapons in self-defence, yet peace was not kept by military means, and the stationing of troops depended on the agreement of all conflict parties. This form of peacekeeping by UN soldiers is still developing an increasingly important civilian component.[14] The extent to which "nonviolent" peacekeeping can do without elements of force, and which intruments are then available, is one of the most important points of the present work.

Our interest is not to achieve an integration of civil and military operations within an increasingly militarised peacekeeping, but rather to influence the conflict parties using less and less threat and violence in order that they develop a productive treatment of their problems, that is, an increasingly "civil" peace strategy. The reason for this approach is above all that the civil way could be the more effective one. For the resolution of conflicts by the international community has faced increasingly difficult problems in the last few years. Since the end of the East-West conflict there has been a shift to intra-state conflict constellations. The practical dilemma is that the successful military separation of the conflict parties does not lead to a resolution of the conflict, especially in the case of protracted social conflicts.[15]

In order to do justice to these challenges conflict transformation must be optimised with the help of the peace strategies. Our hypothesis is that in this regard a combination of the civil peace strategies can be useful. This hypothesis will be explained in more detail in the theoretical section. At this point it is sufficient to point out a trend in the opposite direction which defines the peace strategies as chronologically sequential operations.[16] Peace and conflict research authors such as Ronald J. Fisher or Stephen Ryan question this chronological separation and consider a combination of the strategies[17] to be necessary: "... different interventions are more effective in starting the deescalation process."[18] Fisher stresses in particular the importance of peacebuilding activities at different stages of escalation.[19]

---

[11] Boutros Ghali 1992, Paragraphs 42-45. On "Robust Peacekeeping" see Kühne 1993, for a criticism: Nikutta 1994.

[12] Galtung 1993, p. 49 and 63.

[13] Büttner 1995, p. 17. On the Quakers' Peace Testimony and their peace work see: Helfer 1995, pp. 11-14

[14] Kühne 1993, p. 51 ff. and Ehrhart/Klingenburg 1994, pp. 52-55. On the civil component see: Berdehle 1993.

[15] Fisher 1993, p. 248 ff.

[16] Boutros Ghali 1992 and 1995. Truger 1994, p. 317.

[17] This is especially the position of Fisher 1993, pp. 247-266, p. 253ff., Ryan 1990 p. 51.

[18] Fisher 1993, p. 255.

[19] ibid, p. 254

"... to institute significant de-escalation, peacebuilding is essential, either on its own or as an immediate follow-up to small, interim agreements. The rationale is that only peacebuilding in its various interactive and developmental forms will address the relationship qualities and basic needs that are the heart of the conflict."[20]

Peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking can thus be understood as strategies that fulfill different functions in the de-escalation process. All of the strategies are indispensable in severely escalated conflicts, and hence we see them as elements of an integrated process of intervention for constructive conflict resolution.

2.3 Methods of nonviolent intervention and distinction from other civil interventions

Methods of civil responses to conflict increasingly include the various forms of mediation, but also, for example, fact-finding and election monitoring.[21] Occasionally, further methods and concepts are named that have been developed and systematised in American universities but have so far hardly received attention in Europe: citizen diplomacy, track two diplomacy, conflict resolution approach or T-group resolution.[22]

A comparison of methods and concepts researchers believe to represent appropriate means of action with nonviolent actions leads to the conclusion that the latter have a wider range of action forms. Smaller or larger groups, or coalitions of a number of groups or organisations intervene in a violent intra- or inter-state conflict in order to influence the course of events. The repertoire of nonviolent forms of action includes:

- Peacekeeping: creation of buffer zones or human chains; observation of ceasefires; observation of conflict events to reduce the incidence of violence; escorting of or presence near threatened persons or organisations; appeals.
- Peacemaking: mediation between the conflict parties through various forms of dialogue: e.g. house to house visits, appeals, assemblies, delegations, fact finding, negotiation, creation of publicity between the parties and to the outside.
- Peacebuilding: education work in nonviolence, and trainings to strengthen the conflict resolution skills of the conflict parties and networks of the civil society (empowerment); constructive (psycho-) social work, e.g. refugee support or humanitarian aid; escorting threatened persons as a help towards overcoming fears caused by traumatic experiences; prisoner exchanges; election and human rights observation.

Actions of protest and resistance in the form of demonstrations, boycotts or civil disobedience as well as social defence through non-co-operation by the whole population of an area are also considered.[23] Appeals and publicity work for mobilisation in this direction are also included here.

There is general agreement that early, i.e. if possible preventive, anticipatory intervention has more chance of success and is helpful to a conflict resolution.[24]

---

[20] ibid, p. 259. Fisher defines peace consolidation as: "Developmental and interactive activities, often facilitated by a third party, which are directed towards meeting the basic needs, de-escalating the hostility, and improving the relationship of parties engaged in protracted social conflicts" p. 252.

[21] Ropers 1994, p. 219; Pfaffenholz 1994, pp. 57-70. On fact-finding see: Birckenbach 1994a, pp. 75-85 and on election monitoring "der überblick" 1/93.

[22] The various methods are described in: Burton/Dukes 1990. In Germany the Berghof Research Centre has been working since 1993 on the further development of these methods. Ropers 1994, p. 218 and 227 ff.

[23] Following Müller 1993a, p. 7.

[24] Gandhi called for this as early as 1938. See Büttner 1996, p. 118. On preventive diplomacy see Koppe 1994 and Ropers 1995b.

3 Classifying nonviolent interventions according to conflict theory

3.1   Comparison of escalation and intervention concepts

As our study aims to show the basic patterns in which nonviolent interventions in conflicts function, we try to explain the mechanisms of escalation and de-escalation using models developed in peace and conflict research. We start with the assumption that the escalation process follows laws of its own which increasingly hinder a constructive resolution of the conflict and ultimately makes it impossible. In order to achieve a de-escalation and perhaps a resolution of the conflict, this dynamics has to be slowed, interrupted and ultimately reversed through continuous impulses.

The following overview (Table 1) describes the conflict transformation process and assigns to it various escalation, de-escalation and intervention concepts. It serves primarily to identify the different models and to clarify our understanding of them, and it can be seen also as a first classification. We have taken into account models and concepts developed by Lederach, Mitchell, Fisher (two models), Zartman, Glasl, Koppe and Merkel.[25]

We understand Lederach's concept of "transformation process" as a comprehensive category for the process, as it reflects a particularly broad understanding of conflict and conflict resolution and relates to the category of political power. With the help of this term it is possible, , to grasp the whole process of formation, escalation, de-escalation and peaceful treatment. As we are particularly interested in the reversal of the escalation process, the transition from the escalation to the de-escalation phase is especially important for this study. The authors classify this reversal point in different ways. For Lederach it is the step from "confrontation" to "negotiations" (Lederach, row 10, columns 2 and 3). For Mitchell it is marked by an increasing level of cost-awareness by the conflict parties.[26] Zartman characterises a simliar phenomenon with the terms standstill/stalemate.[27] It is important to note that the the process of de-escalation is not a direct development, and we cannot even assume a particularly strong self-dynamic towards a resolution of the conflict.[28] The de-escalation process can rather be pictured as a phase including systematic, continuous and intensive support for the conflict parties towards a constructive approach to one another, which is continually overshadowed by the danger of setbacks (Merkel, row 7, column 3).[29]

The main features of escalation dynamics are described in the second column, where the escalation cycle from Fisher's model has been inserted in the second row.[30] Where Fisher describes a cycle, Glasl uses a step model.[31] This makes clear the intensification that plays an important role in the escalation dynamic. As we shall see later, both representations - circular, like a vicious circle, and an inclining line - are helpful.[32] Lederach points out that conflicts can remain in this phase for a long time before they are brought to an end, and that the transition from confrontation to negotiation seldom happens without setbacks or without sticking for some time in the vicious circle.[33] In reality phases cannot be so clearly separated from one another as they are presented in the overview.

---

[25]   Lederach 1994, Mitchell 1991, Fisher 1990 and 1993, Zartman 1991a, Koppe 1995, Merkel 1995.

[26]   Quoted in Schirch 1995, p56.

[27]   Zartman 1991b, p16.

[28]   Glasl 1990, pp282-286.

[29]   This important point was made by Christine M. Merkel for this paper

[30]   Fisher 1993, p115.

[31]   Glasl 1990, pp218-219.

[32]   Glasl views the steps as a declining line, with good reason. As we develop a different representation, we assign the step to an upwards spiral. cf Glasl 1990, p215f.

[33]   Lederach 1992, pp33-34.

Asymmetric conflict types are also represented in the overview by models from Zartman, Lederach and Fisher. Lederach points out in the description of his model that the political power between the conflict parties must be (approximately) balanced in order to be able to move from the confrontation phase to the negotiation phase.[34] He understands his model as affirming conflict resolution. He thus views the activating and conscientisation of the conflict as a step in the transformation, whilst stressing that a decision has to be taken during the escalation process over which means are to be used.[35]

Whilst Lederach thus pictures an escalation with nonviolent means, Zartman, for example, defines the use of violence as a characteristic of conflicts which have passed a certain level of intensity.[36] This is certainly correct but, following this logic, a nonviolent overthrow would be impossible. Hardly any author describes the constellation in which one side chooses conflict resolution with strictly nonviolent means whilst the other uses violence. In Lederach's model this constellation could be classified as "overt conflict", but the other terms (Mitchell: "escalating coercion and destruction"; Fisher: "destruction"; Zartman: "confrontation with violence" and "war"; Glasl: "limited destructive strikes", "disintegration" and "mutual decline") would in this case only be adequate to describe the behaviour of one of the conflict parties. In any case it would be inaccurate in our opinion to restrict nonviolent escalation to the early stages of escalated conflicts or to see nonviolent action simply as acts of appeasement or pacification.

Nonviolent action is widely understood and used as a liberation strategy with potentially escalating effect. The unusual feature of a nonviolent escalation ist that those on one's own side in the interaction never cross the threshold of physical violence and uphold the dignity of their opponents.[37] Conflict theory is lacking the terminology to describe this phenomenon adequately. We can only point out these gaps; to fill them would require further studies.[38]

Finally we have taken into account the intervention suggestions from Koppe in the table and assigned them to the various escalation and de-escalation phases. Koppe does not describe the escalation process, but rather a series of interventions intended to influence the conflict resolution in its early stages through de-escalating impulses.

---

[34]   Lederach 1994, Figure IV, The Progression of Conflict.

[35]   Lederach 1994, p32.

[36]   Zartman 1991a, p516.

[37]   cf Goss-Mayr 1981, pp95-101; Galtung 1987, pp133-138 on the practice of Gandhi's Satyagraha standards.

[38]   Here we would be concerned with the erosion of power on the part of the users of violence. Perhaps a study of this aspect of the Indian independence struggle would be worthwhile.

Table 1: The conflict transformation process. Escalation, de-escalation and intervention concepts

	ESCALATION →		DE-ESCALATION →	
	EQUAL GROUP			
Lederach 1994 Figure V, S. 33	Political Power unbalanced / Static	Political power unbalanced / Unstable	Political power balanced / Unstable	Political power balanced / Dynamic
Fisher 1993a, S. 115	Conflict over Interests, values, Needs, power → competition– orientated	Escalation cycle / Group orientation: Group processes (threat, ethnocentrism, mistrust; stereotypes; poor problem – solving; poor communication; pressure, interaction)	Inter-group processes / De-escalating interaction settlement of the argument	Process of constructive conflict resolution
Mitchell	Peaceful contention	Escalating coercion and violence	Cost consciousness and formal negotiaton	Post-agreement peacebuilding
Fisher 1993b, S. 258	Discussion	Polarization | Segregation | Destruction	control violence | desecalate and control hostility | meet basic needs / improve relationship	settle interests
Glasl 1990	① = hardening ② = debate ③ = deeds instead of words	④ = image and coalition strikes ⑤ = loss of face ⑥ = threat strategies ⑦ = limited destructive ⑧ = disintegration ⑨ = mutual decline	⑨ = power intervention ⑧ = power intervention + arbitration process ⑦ = arbitration process + mediation ⑥= arbitration process + mediation ⑤ = mediation and socio-therapeutic support ④ = socio-therapeutic support and process support	③ = Facilitation and process support ② = Facilitation ① = Facilitation ① – ⑨ consolidation
Merkel 1995, S. 63/64	I. latent political tensions II. manifest contradictions and tensions III. militant national demands, political acts of escalation, rumours, international support	IV. isolated attacks V. military resolution VI. blocked conflict	VII. De-escalation, ceasefire, set-backs VIII. Return to non-military forms through armistice, peacekeeping, political compromise	IX. Peacebuilding with non-military means X. Reconstruction of society, reconciliation, return of refugees
	UNEQUAL GROUPS			
Fisher 1993a, S. 115	Perceived injustice, relative deprivation – growth of awareness	collective actions, then further escalation cycle as Fisher 1993a	further as above Fisher 1993a	further as above Fisher 1993a
Lederach 1994 Figure V, S. 33	Latent 1. Education	Overt conflict 2. Confrontation,	3. Negotiation	4. Sustainable Peace
Zartman 1991	1st phase Articulation; request and answer, consolidation, negotiation	2nd phase Mobilising political pressure | 3rd phase confrontation with violence | 4th phase war	Standstill / Stalemate	
	INTERVENTION CONCEPT			
Koppe 1995	Conflict Prevention: early warning, fact finding, conflict resolution, negotiation, mediation	Offers of political solutions and sanctions embargo, boycott; support for opposition, humanitarian aid for the population	Negotiations Armistices Protection areas	Model solutions: status quo ante; integration in a larger area; new solutions supported by international community

3.2 The conflict dynamics pyramid and the effect of de-escalating interventions

Let us now use some of the models in the overview in order to represent systematically, process-orientated and comprehensibly the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation. Firstly we take Galtung's conflict triangle. Galtung distinguishes between the content of a conflict which he defines as the "incompatibilities", and its expression, which is found in the "attitudes" of the actors and their "behaviour" towards one another. The attitudes and behaviour can be attributed to these incompatibilities, which condense to interests and goals, to produce the following triangle.

Content

Attitude   Behaviour

Conflict transformation touches all three corners of the conflict triangle, so that the process of dealing with the conflict and the conflict resolution becomes a circular movement. Galtung's system is simple and comprehensive at the same time. The peace strategies can be assigned to the corners.[39] Peacemaking is concerned with the content, peacekeeping with the control of negative interactions and peacebuilding with the improvement of attitudes and relationships. Peacebuilding touches in our opinion both the attitude side and the behaviour side. Thus, two contrasting peace strategies intervene on the behaviour side: peacekeeping as dissociative strategy, for example through buffer zones or physical separation. Peacebuilding activities aim to produce new, constructive forms of co-operation, after internal animosity has been overcome. Here the parties come together again, having been kept apart by peacekeeping.

Content: Peacemaking

Attitude: Peacebuilding   Behaviour:
                                 Peacekeeping dissociative,
                                 Peacebuilding associative

---

[39]   Galtung 1993, p49.

Friedrich Glasl describes the escalation process in nine detailed and comprehensible stages. He shows how the ability of the conflict parties to act constructively together is reduced more and more by successive mutual bad experiences. He identifies several "points of no return" which contribute decisively to the escalation.[40] When the point has been reached at which talking to one another no longer helps and where the need to take physical action to change the situation dominates, then the end of a constructive approach to the conflict (i.e. dealing with the issues), which the conflict parties can manage alone has been reached (stage 3).

From there the relationship to the opposing party becomes a central part of the content of the conflict itself. "There's no use in talking to them," is the experience, "now we have to act!" From now on, behaviour towards one another become more clearly negative, as do the pictures the opponents have of each other. Since the conflict constellation deteriorates constantly, the parties slide into a situation which is seriously threatening for them. Each feels endangered by the actions of the other (stages 4-6).

The next decisive threshold is crossed when threats and ultimata are superceded by actions directed against the power base of the organisation or group concerned (stage 7). From this moment on the parties no longer see each other in human terms but see only objects which they want to be rid of (stages 7-9). From now on the violence directed against each other becomes the predominant issue of the conflict.

We have transferred Glasl's model from its original context of social conflicts, mostly in or between organisations, to the context of political conflicts. In order to be able to name the transitions in political terms we have used the work of other authors, in particular that of Ronald Fisher, who has already performed this transfer of Glasl's stages. In addition, Zartman's phases and Debiel's stages can also be thus transferred. This produces an index of key words to help with the assigning of a conflict to the appropriate stage.

---

[40]   Glasl 1990 p211ff.

Table 2: Escalation stages of political conflicts

Glasl 1990	Fisher 1993b	Zartman 1991	Debiel 1995
Stage 1: Hardening. Content is to the fore. Differences in the object spheres. Trust in the possibility of solving the problem	Stage 1: Communication. Differing interests. Accurate perception. Interaction is debate and discussion.	Stage 1: Articulation. Asking for an answer. Discrimination. Political process.	Stage 1: Conflict is oppressed. Stage 2: non-violent, articulated. Risk of escalation.
Stage 2: Polarisation and debate. Stronger internal cohesion and closing to the outside. Firm stereotypes develop.	Ongoing: Stage 1	Ongoing: Stage 1. Consolidation.	Ongoing: stage 2 Risk of Escaltion.
Stage 3: Deeds instead of words. *Facts are created to influence issues!* The problem still seems to be solvable, but communication worsens. Still "win-win".	Ongoing: Stage 1.	Ongoing: Stage 1. Negotiations. Political demand. No more appeals to "good will". Employment of political means (protest movement).	Stage 3: non-violent, organised. Risk of escalation.
Stage 4: Image and coalition. The relationship becomes the problem. Stereotypes, "win-lose" situation. Search for domination, for gaps in the norms, for coalition partners.	Stage 2: Polarisation. Questions of relationships are central. Stereotypes, but still want to compromise. Communication becomes indirect, tactics are employed, facts created.	Stage 2: Mobilisation. Wanting to impress through mass actions.	Stage 4: Non-violent, organised mass attention. Risk of escalation. Threshold of violence.
Stage 5: Loss of face. Direct attacks on the positions of the opponent, exposure, exaggeration of negative and positive stereotypes of oneself and the opponent. Pressure applied on surroundings.	Ongoing: Stage 2.	Ongoing: Stage 2. Demand for chances of participation and re-distribution.	Ongoing: Stage4. Risk of Escalation.
Stage 6: Threat strategies. Threats with potential for sanctions, limiting ther ability to act by being bound by the threat, radicalisation and isolated violent acts.	Stage 3: Segregation. Basic needs are threatened. Respect for one another lost. Threats dominate.	Ongoing: Stage 2.	Transition to Stage 5: Sabotage, threat to escalate violence, aggressive settlement policy and occupation of land. Risk of escalation/violent/protracted.
Stage 7: Limited acts of destruction. De-humanised stereotypes. Relationships as well as issues should be solved without emotion. Martial law. *Own actions are target the opponents' potential for sanctions, own losses are accepted.* "Lose-lose".	Stage 4: Destruction. Question of survival. War. Communication becomes propaganda. Opponent is de-humanised, his destruction accepted. Own losses are accepted.	Stage 3: Confrontation. Secession is the goal. Violence as means, guerilla develops.	Stage 6: Militarised stage. Still isolated violence against persons. Stage 7: Low intensity conflict. Containing violence, smouldering, transition to violent, military conflict.
Stage 8: Dissolution. The basis of power and existence of the opponent are targets.	Ongoing: Stage 4. Management of destruction.	Stage 4: War.	Stage 8: Smaller military conflict. Stage 9: medium conflicts, massacres, violent military conflict.
Stage 9: Mutual destruction. Autistic hate of the opponent ends in self-hate. total confrontation even at the price of one's own destruction. Opponent must be eliminated.	Ongoing: Stage 4. Mutual destruction. International war.	Ongoing: stage 4.	Stage 10: War. Systematic killing including possible genocide. Violent, war.

Glasl's stages are the most detailed, therefore we continue to work with this concept. The other authors' terms are used to transfer peace and conflict research terminolgy onto Glasl's schema. In particular, Zartman and Debiel help to determine the escalation level of asymmetrical conflicts.

With the help of the stages the triangle can now be portrayed as a dynamic and the escalation process made visible. A picture appears of a three-sided equilateral pyramid, and the circle of conflict handling is transformed into a spiral of escalation. As before, the conflict handling touches all three corners equally. It cannot be envisaged without content, behaviour and attitudes. But now the way the contents change in the course of the escalation becomes visible. Each bad problem resolution leads to a change in the issues, which move a little way up the "contents" edge of the pyramid. The same takes place with the attitudes and behaviour.

Diagram 1:Conflict pyramid with the conflict handling spiral in the escalation process (viewed from above)

What, then, drives the escalation forward? Does it start equally from all three corners and occur at the same rate along all three edges at all escalation stages? Do impulses come from one corner, then another? Or only from one corner? We have started by viewing escalation as an impulse that drives the conflict handling spiral upwards and thus causes a worsening of the conflict. We now identify as sources of impulse the following escalation factors from Glasl. He describes them as the "basic mechanisms of the escalation dynamic" that drive the escalation at all stages.[41]

---

[41] Glasl 1990, p191, and for the following section pp191-210.

"1. Increasing projection along with growing self-frustration ...
2. Simultaneous broadening and cognitive simplification of the issues ...
3. Interweaving of cause and effect whilst simplifying causal relationships ...
4. Broadening the social dimension whilst tending to personify the conflict ...
5. Accelerating through braking ... ."[42]

These factors can easily be assigned to one of the "conflict corners", sometimes to more than one. Factor 1, as well as factors 2 and 3 to the extent that they relate to the processes within the conflict parties, comes within the category of attitudes. Factors 2 and 3 affect the "contents", at least if they concern the current conflict issue and how the problem is to be resolved. Factors 4 and 5 concern "behaviour" of the parties, both towards one another and towards their social environment.

Diagram 2: Conflict pyramid with escalation factors

The conflict handling spiral runs around the pyramid, and every time it passes an edge it receives a negative impulse which pushes the spiral upwards.

Although, according to Glasl, the escalation factors affect the whole of the escalation process, it seems to us that individual factors are especially influential at different times. If according to Glasl the transitions between the different stages each mark important turning points[43], then it is possible to demonstrate using the stages described in Table 2 that different escalation factors carry different weight. During stages 1-3 factual problems which seem to be solvable dominate, but nevertheless no satisfying solution is found. The processes on the attitudes level (projection and self-frustration, simplification, forming of stereotypes) cause the ability to solve the problem to deteriorate. Through broadening of the issues, interweaving of cause and effect it becomes more and more difficult to reach a result, until the parties come to the conclusion that talking and negotiating with the "other" will not produce a solution, and new facts are created through physical action. In this first phase the main impulse of escalation seems to be on the contents level.

---

[42]   ibid.
[43]   Glasl 1990, pp211-214.

From the fourth stage on the relationship between the parties becomes the problem. Up to stage 6 we see the escalation factors on the attitudes level as the most influential. Negative pictures of each other harden, deepen and become self-fulfilling prophecies. On the behaviour level the search for coalition partners and the exertion of pressure on the social environment begin. Behavioural norms are not yet questioned, but chances to "unmask" the opponent are looked for.

At stage 6 there is an important turning point. Behaviour which was up till now orientated along common norms is called into question by the use of threat strategies, which leads to a renewed deep sense of insecurity. At the next stage, 7, the impulse changes to the behaviour level. The threatened behaviour is put into practice in order to force the opponent to capitulate. From now on the conflict parties' perception is directed increasingly towards the behaviour level. Applying these observations to the conflict pyramid produces the following "escalation track":

Diagram 3: Conflict pyramid and escalation track

The picture of the conflict pyramid with the escalation track should give a first analytical orientation for the escalation process in a conflict. The primary concern of this study is the question of how to envisage and achieve a reversal of this process. If the assumption that there is an escalation "track" is right, then the question arises whether an attempt to de-escalate the situation implies that activities on all three edges (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding) are equally useful, and whether there are, for the various phases, activities which are especially necessary, or even activities that are contra-productive. Which intervention is useful at a given point on the escalation track in order to slow down the process and perhaps even stop or reverse it?

At this point we can apply Ronald Fisher's model, which develops further Glasl's work. Four main stages are defined and, for each escalation stage, certain main interventions are suggested which would serve to achieve a sustainable de-escalation. As can be seen from Table 2, Fisher identifies a total of four escalation stages that structure the escalation process:

Diagram 4: Four escalation stages following Fisher (the 9 marks represent Glasl's stages.)

Which conclusions for de-escalating and conflict resolving interventions can be drawn from this escalation process? Ronald Fisher has adapted Friedrich Glasl's model to international conflicts and built it into his own model.[44]

Diagram 5: Approaches to Peace in a Contingency Model

Stage of Escalation	Sequence of Intervention	Outcomes for De-escalation
Destruction	Peacekeeping	Control violence
	Peacebuilding	
Segregation	Peacepushing	De-escalate or control hostility
	Peacebuilding	
Polarization	Peacebuilding	Meet basic needs improve relationship
	Peacemaking	
Discussion	Peacemaking	Settle interests

Fisher's model seems at first surprising, because he does not place peacemaking activities at the beginning, but considers peacekeeping to be the most urgent intervention at the highest stages of escalation. Peacemaking activities at this level serve the aim of achieving an agreement over the control of behaviour. The peace strategy peacemaking is thus assigned

---

44   Fisher 1990, p235, and Fisher 1993a, p254.

to the task of peacekeeping. Fisher introduces his own term "peacepushing", comparable to Glasl's "arbitration process" or "power mediation". What is meant is a relatively strong and forcing exertion of influence on the scope of action of the conflict parties by intervening third parties. A third feature of Fisher's model is that he not only defines main interventions but also a combination of main and further interventions. We will return to this later, as it approaches very closely our understanding of a closely integrated use of the peace strategies in the de-escalation process.

Fisher has defined main directions of impact of de-escalating interventions for the different stages of escalation. These are: at the "destruction" stage (Glasl 7-9): "control violence"; at the "segregation" stage (Glasl 6): "de-escalate or control hostility"; at the "polarisation" stage (Glasl 3-5): "meet basic needs, improve relationships"; and at the "discussion" stage (Glasl 1-2): "settle interests".

If these main interventions are compared with the escalation track, it can be seen that Fisher returns along the same track. When the conflict is at stages 7-9, control and containment of violence is the first goal which needs to be negotiated. At the same time, peacebuilding activities are needed to stabilise this state and to prepare the parties to clarify basic needs (security, identity, participation) and to improve their relationship. At this point the transiton to Glasl's stages 4-6 is possible, where mutual relations are the main problem. Progress at this level means that the parties re-learn to build their relationship more contructively. They have now gone a long way towards normality, and their bad experiences have been replaced by better ones. When they have reached stage 3, peacemaking can give facilitating support to the regulation of contrasting interests. Mutual attitudes and behaviour have more or less normalised.

At the lowest stage of escalation (Fisher: "discussion"; Glasl: stages 1-3) the issue is the regulation of contrasting interests, and the intervenors are now needed to give support to the solution of the problems. In principle we see here the transition to independent conflict handling by the conflict parties themselves. They are now more or less able to work together on the problems. Their relationship has a new basis (stages 5-3), and their behaviour towards each other is sufficiently constructive to deal with future problems creatively. In this respect this stage is also the transition to a "sustainable peace" (Lederach) and to "post-agreement peacebuilding" (Mitchell).[45] Here is the point at which the intervenors may leave, or the transition to the consolidation phase begins.[46]

The additonal interventions which Fisher uses to achieve the downward turns to the next lower stage of escalation make clear that de-escalation cannot be conceived of as an isolated acitvity in the sense of "only" peacekeeping, peacemaking or peacebulding, but must instead take all three corners of the triangle into account. In addition, one can postulate that further supporting impulses are necessary to counterbalance the self-dynamic of escalation. Perhaps it is helpful to consider that for a particular escalation stage there is one edge on which the necessary de-escalating impulse must be given, whilst activities on the other two edges serve to realise this impulse. For example, at stages 7-9 negotiations over a ceasefire (peacemaking activities) and an exchange of prisoners or other well-intentioned gestures (peacebuilding activities) serve to realise the necessary de-escalating impulse of controlling behaviour (peacekeeping).

What do interventions that have this de-escalating effect look like? Glasl defines for stages 9-7 the "power intervention", for stages 8-6 the "arbitration process", and for stage 7

---

[45] Lederach 1994, pp35-37; Mitchell, quoted in Schirch 1995, p56.
[46] Glasl 1990, pp430-432.

downwards "mediation" as de-escalating interventions. The intervening parties prescribe through authoritative interventions both behaviour and content (arbitration). In order to check the results they must exercise sufficient power and have a sufficient time commitment to the process.

From stages 7-5 "mediation" is applied as intervention, from stages 5-4 "socio-therapeutic process support" can be used. "Process support" and "facilitation" are the interventions for stage 3-1. If we accept the lack of clarity at the transitions at stages 7 and 6 (in our opinion Fisher portrays Glasl's stage 6 as a separate phase, "segregation"), and transfer these suggestions to the conflict dynamic pyramid, we produce, for the individual corners in the various phases, the following main interventions as de-escalation track:

Diagram 6: De-escalation track

Attitudes:
Improvement of relationships and basic needs (stages 5-3)

Content:
Regulate difference of interest. (stages 3-1)

Behaviour:
Controlling violence (stages 9-6

Behaviour:
New, constructive behaviour (stages 9-6

In our view the escalation track on the conflict dynamic pyramid can be retraced in the de-escalation process. This does not mean that the whole history and development of the conflict has to be retraced. In the case of most social conflicts, which usually have a long history, this is not even possible. The conflict history will probably crop up at particular points during the conflict handling in the form of traumas, myths and violent cultural forms, which then have to be dealt with. The de-escalation track should help identify the next step at any point in order to achieve a further de-escalation.

This also means that de-escalating impulses on the attitudes edge of the pyramid will be fruitless if the conflict is at one of the stages 6-9. At such a level the physical survival in the middle of a violent interaction is a more urgent problem. This has to be dealt with through peacekeeping measures if the conflict parties are to find a way out of their entanglement.

It is nevertheless important to note that impulses on the attitudes edge can be necessary and decisive if they serve other purposes, for example the creation of constructive relations between the intervenors and the conflict parties. But this is another aspect. At this point, however, we are more concerned with the main direction of interventions that can lead to sustainable de-escalation.

The model shows clearly how long controlling behaviour plays an important role in any de-escalation, but that alone it cannot achieve sustainable de-escalation without work on the other "edges". It can also be seen how work on attitudes and control of behaviour complement each other at stages 6-4. It is also possible that the issues that can be negotiated, and which must be resolved, depend on the level of escalation. A consequence of this is that all

three edges have to be worked on at all stages of de-escalation, although the main direction of intervention will be different in any given phase.

Thus the three peace strategies serve different functions depending on the state of escalation. Understood this way, peacemaking does not automatically mean the solving of the original problem. The issues in question depend far more on which stage the conflict has reached. Peacemaking thus means the solving of the current important problems of the pressing conflict phase. Analogously peacebuilding would mean the changing of the attitudes specific to the pressing conflict stage and, through new insights and outlooks, the developing of a willingness to try out new relations and agreements. Peacekeeping similarly aims above all to prevent or end violent and repressive behaviour.

Finally it can be seen that the de-escalation process touches all three edges at all stages. That is, at each stage, not only elements of one peace strategy are important, but also those of the others. In this respect the peace strategies are elements of a comprehensive concept of de-escalation and conflict resolution. This also means that the whole process can get stuck when progress ceases to be made on the edges other than the main intervention, so that the downward spiral gets "caught" on one or more corners. Perhaps this picture can explain why a continuous combination of the peace strategies is necessary for a genuine peace process.

3.3   Determining the specific character of nonviolent interventions

If we transfer nonviolent interventions into this scheme we can describe their approach roughly as follows: the actors build up positive relations to the individual conflict parties and provide communication on the observed reality of the conflict (e.g. through publicity, reports, fact-finding, presence, etc). The transported messages (e.g. revealing attacks) call the legitimacy of the current conflict behaviour and the validity of the parties' srategy to solve the problem into question without causing the parties to fear loss of face or the use of violence. Each party is confronted with a mirror that reveals what it is doing, in contrast to how it sees itself and how it wishes to be seen by the third party.

At the same time the existence of a third party on the scene of events make it easier for the conflict parties to take a more constructive approach to behaviour and problem solving. A reversal of the escalation becomes possible by the conflict parties being by giving, and taking, the chance to question their own behaviour, and by receiving support in their search for different ways to approach the problem. To reach this goal it can be necessary first to develop and strengthen the will of the conflict parties to regulate the conflict peacefully and to support the expectation that solutions are possible.[47]

Which de-escalating interventions are available to nonviolent action teams? How do they differ from other civil interventions? If we relate the case studies to the escalation stages we find that almost all of them take place in situations in which death threats, assassination (attempts) and sometimes outright war take place or can be expected. In the case of the Balkan Peace Team the conflict is initially characterised by the threat of violence, and after a year of the team's work military actions break out. The Cyprus Resettlement Project is similar, in that it begins during a relatively low escalation stage which suddenly escalates into a violent, warlike situation. In almost all these cases the conflict parties were so frustrated with each other that they only wanted to get rid of one another. Except for the the Cyprus Resettlement Project, which is at a lower escalation stage, we can roughly classify the cases

---

[47]   Glasl 1990, p361.

as being at stage 6 and upwards.[48] What possibilities to act exist at all at these stages, and what distinguishes nonviolent interventions?

The "de-escalating interaction" (Fisher, see Table 1) that brings the conflict parties at stage 7 (Glasl) out of the spiral of violence consists according to Glasl solely of a "power intervention", an arbitration process, that is, the exercise of compelling force by a superior authority with corresponding commitment and ability to impose itself - and lasting control. He still sees a chance for a mediation that restricts itself to negotiating solutions for issues and process based questions only until stage 7, but not at later stages. In contrast, nonviolent interventions rarely have either the means for a "power intervention" nor the compelling authority - even if it were only moral - of an arbitrator. They certainly do not have compelling impositive force.

Nonviolent intervenors are thus challenged to keep the parties apart without these means. Nonviolent peacekeeping, which at these stages aims to control the violence and end hostilities, uses methods of interposition (for smaller confontations), observation and monitoring. In addition, the corresponding peacemaking activities are used to negotiate a ceasefire. The lack of compelling force is made up for by contact, positive relations with the conflict parties and by a reliable presence. The effectiveness of nonviolent peacekeeping is probably to a decisive extent dependent on how constructive the relations to the individual parties are, which further forms of pressure can be activated, and how far and how effectively pressure from civil society is exerted on the conflict parties. In place of physical force, social and nonviolent means such as maintaining a presence, or escort protection, take effect.

Positive contact between the intervening parties and the conflict parties means that the latter feel themselves recognised in their positive self-image and genuinely taken seriously. This positive contact to various parties makes it possible for the intervenors to work - simultaneously with peacekeeping - on peacebuilding (i.e. reconciliation work). The combination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding seems to Fisher to be a chance to start a real process of de-escalation and not just stop at a ceasefire. The fact that nonviolent interventions are based on positive relations to the conflict parties leads to possibilities for action both for peacekeeping and for peacebuilding (on the one hand separating, on the other bringing together). It becomes apparent that such activities require reliable, long-term work and cannot be achieved through short, one-off actions.

If the control of violence at the stages "destruction" and "segregation" can be achieved, at the next lower stage an improvement of relations and the satisfying of basic needs is necessary, according to Fisher. Nonviolent interventions are directed mainly at the behaviour and mutual attitudes of the conflict parties. In peacebuilding, activities lead to an empowerment of civil society whose chances to participate are raised and whose share in power thus grows. In this way the conflict resolution ability of the societal system is improved.

Nonviolent interventions seem to refer less continuously to the solution of the issues concerned. But if no significant progress is made in this respect there is a danger of a relapse into the spiral of violence. Actions which are possible here are the support or protection of civil structures in society that are pushing for a solution to the problems, and direct urging for solutions.

In two cases (Nagaland and EMPSA) the insolubility of and consideration for the central issue respectively played a key role in the control of violence and for future expectations.

---

[48] See the following chapter on the case studies.

The problem can be demonstrated using the two examples in which it occurred most clearly. An independence struggle developed between the Nagas, an ethnic group in north-eastern India, and the Indian government over the question whether self-determination for the Nagas should include independence from India or not. The Indian position has essentially remained unchanged since 1947. During that time, however, the extent of autonomy of Nagaland within the Indian Union did grow. This willingness to co-operate on the part of India split the Nagas and led to an internal civil war. The division within the Nagas has remained to this day, and the Indian government has made it quite clear that they will use the military to fight any armed resistance. Our conclusion: part of the problem remained unresolved and the balance of power remained unequal. The expectation that nothing will change on the central issue feeds acceptance of the guerillas even now.

In the second case, the EMPSA programme, the organisers combined the contents level with the behaviour level. Whilst the monitoring programme, through observation, publication and responsibility, served to control the conflict parties' behaviour, the churches urged those with political responsibility on the national level to push on with the process of change and to produce results by setting a date for elections and drafting interim regulations. The process of change was delayed several times and began to bog down, and it became clear to the EMPSA organisers that an unstoppable escalation of violence would take place if frustration over the lack of progress on the issues grew too large. Hence their persistent pressuring and continual intitiatives for dealing with the contents level.

During the monitoring process a further connection between violence (behaviour level) and the process of change (contents level) stood out. When political breakthroughs were achieved, massacres took place. Progress on the contents level was being accompanied by violent escalation. For the organisers of the EMPSA programme this was a sign that the process of change was being deliberately disrupted. Acts of violence were intended to create a climate of hate and civil war. This was thus a further reason to press for swift results; at the same time it confirms the necessity of such programmes during a process of change.

Fisher, too[49], hints at a possibly close relationship between the solution of the original problem and a sustainable improvement in relations: his main strategy at the "polarisation" stage (Glasl 3-5) is peacebuilding, in order to satisfy basic needs and improve relations. To reach the next lower stage, peacemaking is in his view necessary, that is, dealing successfully with the issues.

The main difference between nonviolent interventions and civil interventions lies in the fact that nonviolent interventions do not wish to make use of a forceful "power intervention" to separate the conflict parties. To reach this goal they have hitherto followed various strategies based on different approaches and to varying degrees of success. Here there are two different approaches. The less successful approach attempts to influence the conflict parties through the presence of a large number of civilians in a war-zone. A statement on the potential of this approach is not possible, because in our examples in case 8 (Mir Sada) the action was broken off before a possible confrontation, and in case 6 (Gulf Peace Team) no large number of participants came together. Then this approach would have had to prove itself in a real situation.

More successful was another approach, which first worked on establishing good and stable contacts to all the conflict parties (cases 1-4, 7, 9 and 10). In a strongly polarised conflct this is a great achievement in itself, because beyond a certain stage of escalation the parties usually view outsiders only as friend or foe.[50] These social relations were the basis which

---

[49]   Fisher 1993, p. 258.
[50]   Glasl 1990, p. 280.

enabled small teams of nonviolent intervenors to be granted the moral authority to monitor ceasefires, (case 1), go between mutually threatening groups (cases 7, 9 possibly, 10), and prevent renewed escalation (cases 2 and 3).

A further difference lies in the fact that nonviolent interventions do not wish to apply directly methods which exert repressive power. The repressive aspect in the alarm networks marks the limit. Peace Brigades International were the first to develop this instrument. The emergency response network mobilises in the shortest possible time relevant international publicity which cannot be ignored when - as happened in the case of Guatemala - it has consequences on the US American military aid to the state which is acting repressively.

Here use is made of repressive power which (other) third parties can exert on a particular conflict party. However, this power must first be activated and be prepared to let itself be mobilised to act for particular values, such as human rights against weapons export. The use of this power is hence not always available or "on-call", but rather somewhat precarious.

Thus, we can discern two differing sources of power from which nonviolent interventions gain their strength. One is the direct and constructive relationship which arises between the conflict parties and the intervenors, and the second is the use of negative sanctions which result from a loss of reputation. Here, too, relations are ultimately used to effect - in the latter case relations of actors on other more formal, state levels.

If the hypothesis is true that constructive relations form the core of nonviolent ways to exert influence, then this would confirm Lakey's hypothesis of the sociological effectiveness of nonviolence. Lakey points to the meaning of collective mutual debasement as a precondition for violent behaviour. Nonviolent action works on this debasement, and only then a rapprochement of the conflict parties can take place.[51] This also explains how the relationship of respect can come into being that is a prerequisite for the efficiency of forms of behaviour that are nonviolent and not based on force, according to Mitchell.[52] Once again the fundamental nature of the task, postulated by Lakey, of building up this respect through nonviolent action becomes clear.

3.4   The interventions' starting points - segments of conflict handling

The overview of the transformation process is used to guide the classification and evaluation of the starting points and scope of the specific and very different interventions. We are basing the starting points on the stage of escalation of the conflict when the intervention took place, and on the social level within the conflict at which the intervenors were active. For the latter classification we adopt Lederach's division of society into top, middle and grassroots levels.[53] Lederach divides the actors on a conflict into three level of leadership. On the top level are the usually few people of the highest class of leadership. These are the leading political and military figures with wide decision-making powers and high visibility. On the middle level is the in number much larger group of leading figures who are important in particular social areas. They are, for example, ethnic or religious leaders, academics, intellectuals and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). On the grass-

---

[51]   Mitchell 1981, p141; Lakey 1979, p69 and p71.
[52]   Mitchell 1981, p142.
[53]   Lederach 1994, Figure IV: Actors and Peacebuilding Foci Across the Affected Population.

roots level are those persons who have local leadership roles: representatives of indigenous NGOs, workers in communal development projects, spokespeople of citizens' groups, directors of local refugee camps, etc.

Using this classification we can sort the interventions according to their social level. However, this cannot describe the sometimes very different effects of de-escalation processes on different social levels. For this there is the need for a conceptional differentiation which has not yet defined in order, for example, to include de-escalation processes that are visible in civil society yet have no influence on the military struggle between guerillas and the army. Hence we refer in the following to various "segments of a society" with differing escalation levels. In this way we could describe the phenomenon that the escalation level reduces for the direct target groups whilst remaining on the same high level for the environment (two cases: CRP and PBI). Without such a differentiation of social segments, interventions by the international peace brigades theoretically do not even exist.

A differentiation according to segments is possible by examining closely the "spiral of conflict handling". This contains the interaction of the conflict parties in various areas (segments) of society. We put together the actors who use violence against one another with those who are subject to violence. The interaction is determined by the presence of the use of violence or the suffering of violence. From stage 6 upwards it seems to us that this differentiation is possible and that a concentration on violent interaction is useful. This is because from stage 6 upwards the purposeful killing of people as a means of approaching the conflict threatens to take over from the previous, mainly political means. At subsequent stages the killing intensifies. Interventions at this level are challenged to bring this behaviour to an end.

We have undertaken a rough division of a number of segments in which such violence takes place and which can be affected by an intervention. Not all of them have to be present in every conflict, and a first important analytical step in a given conflict is the exact determination of the specific segments affected by violence.

Diagram 7: Differentiating the actors on the spiral of conflict handling: conflict segments

| Army versus guerillas |
| Army versus population |
| Army versus civil society |
| Within civil society |
| Civil society versus population |
| Repression versus population |
| Within different groups of the population |

4 Empirics

4.1 Case descriptions and transcription into the Tables "Transformation process" (Table 1) and "Escalation stages" (Table 2)

An overview of the cases studied is given in Table 3, which summarises the duration of the intervention, the number of team members, and people affected by the intervention.

Table 3: Number of team members, affected persons and societal segments

Case	Duration of the action	Number of team members	Number of people affected
1. Nagaland (1964-1972)	8 years	Peace mission: 3 observer team: approx 4	Population of the Indian Federal State of Nagaland, approx. 500 000 people
2. Shanti Sena (1968/69)	5 months	20 to 140	Population in urban areas of unrest
3. CRP (1972-1974)	1 1/2 years	Max 17	Ethnic group leaders on Cyprus and 4 village communities
4. PBI (1983-1996)	So far 13 years	Max 14	Politically active persons in civil society, members of human rights groups, trades unions, indigenous groups, etc
5. IFAG (1990/91) 6. GPT (1990/91)	3 months, then aid project 2 months, then aid project	Approx 30 Max 73	Target: whole population of the countries affected by war. Unclear how many people were reached
7. EMPSA (1992-1994)	19 months	Max 300	Civil society and population near the teams
8. Mir Sada (August 1993)	Up to 14 days	Max 3000	Population in area travelled through and in Sarajevo
9. Sjeme Mira (Nov-Dec 1993)	21 days	19	Target: population in Mostar. Achieved: Middle and grassroots persons of almost all conflict parties and civil society
10. BPTI (1994-1996)	So far 2 years, ongoing	Max 4-6	Middle and grassroots level persons and individuals where the teams are active

For the presentation of the individual cases we use the following pattern: we first describe the development of the conflict, show clearly the start of the intervention and name the plan, mission and goal. The section on the composition of the actors makes clear who the actors are. We have then summarised in key words the specific intervention methods and related them to the three peace strategies. Then follows a description of the effect of the intervention and the further development of the conflict. By relating this to the transformation process of the conflict we then attempt to analyse and classify the effect of the intervention.

4.1.1 Case 1: Nagaland Peace Mission 1964-1972

Development of the conflict

The conflict over the relationship between the Nagaland, a mountain region in north-east India, and the developing Indian Union increased between 1947 and 1958 from nonviolent "articulation" (Table 1: Zartman / 1st phase, column 2) to war with several thousand deaths on both sides (Table 1: Zartman / 4th phase, column 3; Table 2: Glasl / stage 8; Debiel / stage 8 and 9). Beteeen 1958 and 1963 the independence movement split into two parts: one accepts existence within the Indian Union, the other still insists on state autonomy. Owing to this split, from the beginning of the 1960s the resistance movement has to be mobilised anew (Table 1: Zartman / 2nd phase, column 3). In 1963 Nagaland becomes a Federal State within India. In this situation renewed confrontation with violence begins (Table 1: Zartman / 3rd phase, column 3).

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

At this point church leaders invite a number of known and respected personalities to form a "Peace Mission". The initiative comes from the middle level of the society affected by the conflict. It is felt that the mixed team of outsiders (M. Scott from Great Britain) and insiders (J. Narayan, member of the nonviolent movement in India, and Chaliha, President of the neighbouring state of Assam) will more easily find a way out of the crisis than those directly involved.[54] The time of the intervention is advantageous, as there is a great awareness on all sides for the high costs of a further escalation (Table 1, Mitchell / column 4). The Peace Mission intervention aims at both a de-escalation and at a resolution of the conflict. A ceasefire should be achieved and stabilised, followed by a political solution to bring the conflict back to the political level.

Composition of the actors

The selection of the members of the "Peace Mission" is carried out by affected persons in the form of an invitation from leaders of the Nagaland Church Council. The "Peace Mission" members only meet on site and develop their strategy ad hoc. The "Peace Mission" suggest people for the "Observer Team". When personnel changes in the "Observer Team" are necessary, persons close to Shanti Sena are called up. At times the conflict parties also send members to the "Observer Team".

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

First contacts are established by the "Peace Mission" through a tour and talks. In the process they learn the conflict parties' positions, and they succeed in negotiating the conditions for a ceasefire (PM), which the conflict parties sign and to a large degree abide by. During the subsequent direct talks between the conflict parties in Nagaland the "Peace Mission" provide facilitation (PB) and also make suggestions on the issues (PM). In the face of increasing violations of the ceasefire following dashed hopes for a quick resolution of the conflict, the "Peace Mission" initiate the "Observer Team" to monitor the ceasefire (PK).

The "Peace Mission" escort the underground leaders during a meeting at the top level in New Delhi (PB).

After the dissolution of the "Peace Mission", the initiative for active support for the peace process switches to the "Observer Team", who work in close co-operation with the church leadership in Nagaland. The team propose an extension of the ceasefire (PM) and monitor it

---

[54] Cf. Schirch 1995, pp44-54 on the still open question of what amount of distance, neutrality or involvement is most suitable for nonviolent interventions.

through fact-finding, reports (PK) and suggestions aimed to help deal with violations (PM for PK). In the run-up to expected clashes they work to de-escalate through presence, monitoring and mediation at the scene or through interventions involving decision-makers at the Top level (PK). They broaden support within society for the maintenance of the ceasefire through regional peace centres and the establishment of a Youth Peace Brigade (PB). The "Observer Team" are also active for the release of prisoners and to stabilise the political process through presence during elections and at other opportunities.

Further development of the conflict and effects of the intervention

Between 1964 and 1972 an improvement takes place on the middle and grassroots level in relation between the groups within Nagaland and to the Indian Union. Several basic needs, such as security, and participation in the political process are stabilised (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4). The question of identity remains, at least on the state level, unresolved. The Indian strategy of "divide and rule" leaves no room to manoeuvre on the state level. On the other hand, the military de-escalation allows economic and social development in Nagaland through generous aid from India. Hence, some of the conflict parties reap the benefits of the de-escalation process and develop a less antagonistic attitude towards India (Table 1: Fisher / row 3, column 4). The unresolved identity issue splits the Naga resistance, and violent clashes between the army and undergound groups repeatedly threaten the ceasefire (Table 2: Glasl / stage 7; Debiel / stage 6). The "Observer Team" disbands in 1972 when the Indian government removes the basis of its work by declaring the resistance to be a criminal problem and use the newly installed police in Nagaland to combat it.

In the 1990s, new problem areas (migration, population development) are added to the basic conflict, which keep support for the underground movement alive.

Translation to the process of conflict transformation

As the "Peace Mission" begins, the conflict lies just short of the transition to a comprehensive civil war in Nagaland, after the underground and the army had carried out violent actions, and several leading figures had been assassinated over a long period (Table 2: Glasl / stage 7 to 8). The transition has not yet taken place, and this is the chance for the "Peace Mission", which first attempts to bring the violence under control (Diagram 6: Violence control at stages 9-6). This succeeds with the agreement of a ceasefire which the "Peace Mission" manage to negotiate. There is a temporary de-escalation to stage 5 when the guerillas and the army refrain from threats and even agree "modi vivendi" for dangerous situations ("e.g. neither side shoots first"). Work on the question of state identity is left ot the conflict parties, who make no progress. The expected top-level talks are delayed by the sudden death of two Indian state presidents, and take place only years later. The "Peace Mission" develop a proposal for the main issue which is presented to the conflict parties but turned down. Conflict handling stays caught on the "contents edge", and the disappointment over the lack of progress puts the control of violence at risk. At this point the "Observer Team" is created, which works continuously for seven years on controlling the violence, and establishes peacekeeping activities within society through varied peacebuilding initiatives and activities.

Segments with varying levels of violence can be distinguished for which the following approximate changes can be observed during the intervention.

Army versus guerillas	from 7/8 to 5 and back to 6/7
Army versus population	from 7/8 to 3: initially the population is affected in the military actions against the guerillas. The population's security improves. In 1971 the firearms law is repealed
Army versus civil society	7/8 to 4, transition to political process is possible. In 1972 renewed threat to the polical supporters of the resistance
Within civil society	7/8 to 4, but relations remain problematic. 1968: renewed escalation to 6/7
Civil society versus population	6/7, threat of comprehensive war and attacks, then calmer, and end of the 1960s more attacks: 6/7
Anonymous repression against population	groups responsible can be identified
Within various population groups	unknown

It is possible in our opinion to speak here of a de-escalation of the whole conflict by one stage, and in certain segments by several stages. The sustainability of this de-escalation, which was achieved by a very small number of actors, seems to be the most important result.

4.1.2 Case 2: Communal riots in Ahmedabad 1968/69

Development of the conflict

The escalation is described by the conflict type "communalism":[55] This is characterised by local or regional social and cultural tensions between population groups over a long period. The origins of communalism are various, and lie for example in the Hindu caste system, majority-minority issues (e.g. Hindu-Moslem) or in language conflicts. Often these reasons are mixed with social factors. At this stage the conflict is latent, but can very quickly flare up into confrontation with a high level of violence (Table 1: Lederach / row 10, columns 2 and 3). The escalation is surprising and quickly reaches a high level; in the process it jumps from a state of "polarisation", visible through the existence of separate living areas, separation through the caste system, religion and low social mobility, to "destruction" (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 3). Often the smallest of impulses, such as rumours, are sufficient to mobilise the conflict parties. Dealing with the conflict is hardly the issue: it is more about simply reacting with violence (Table 1: Glasl / jump from stage 3/4 up to stage 8).

In the case examined Hindus and Moslems stand opposed to one another. Various influential and economically powerful persons use the riots as an excuse to drive poorer sections of the population from expensive building land.[56] The conflict escalates very quickly and leads to greater use of violence (Table 2: Glasl and Debiel / stage 7 to 8). At this point the Indian military intervenes and limits the violence at the peak of the crisis (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4: "control violence").

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

The Shanti Sena become active in this situation after members of their own organisation ("Shanti Sainiks") call them to the affected city and the initial logistical difficulties can be overcome. They carry out their own "mission" according to the aims of their organisation.

---

[55] Schulze 1993, pp. 39-40.
[56] Desai 1972, p. 33.

This is, through their intervention to contain the violence, de-escalate the situation, remove the cause of the conflict and lay the foundation for a new society.

Composition of the actors

The Shanti Sena are part of the nonviolent movement in India. They have experience in nonviolent intervention in their own country and see this as a self-chosen task. Some members have experience of nonviolent interventions abroad.

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

Before the military intervention individual actions by members of Shanti Sena to protect threatened persons take place (PK). As an organisation Shanti Sena begin with fact-finding on the three levels (Top/Middle/Grassroots) (PM for PK). At the same time, contacts to the population are built up through clearing-up work and camp visits (PB). Communication between not clearly definable conflict parties is achieved through assemblies, house-to-house visits, offender-victim meetings (PM and PB) and through press organs set up for the purpose (publicity work). These activities have a conflict regulating character in as far as the conflict parties do not appear in public or let themselves be identified as such. Offenders can take part in the search for ways to deal with the conflict under the protection of the assemblies' anonymity. The Shanti Sainiks strengthen the population's ability to deal with conflict through the setting-up of self-help groups and local NGOs (PB).

Further development of the conflict

Since the 1980s the character of the "communal riots" have shifted. Such conflicts are deliberately sparked off by "fundamentalist" Hindu parties and intrumentalised for their nationalistic politics, as, for example in the conflict over the Ayodhya mosque in 1992.[57] The Shanti Sena still exist formally, but have hardly been active since the mid 1970s. In the local riots of the 1990s members of the Shanti Sena have recalled their organisation's tradition and have worked individually on de-escalation.

Translation to the process of conflict transformation

After the military intervention the subsequent steps are initiated by the Shanti Sena: communication work by the Shanti Sena contributes to a de-escalation and reduction in hostility, up to a limited agreement (comparable with Table 1: Glasl / stage 5-4, column 4: mediation and process support). After a time co-operation develops with state/city authorities in order to organise together the humanitarian aid and return of the exiles (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4 and 5: "meet basic needs" to "settle interests").

The cycle of violence is initially broken by the Indian army's violent power intervention (Table 1: Glasl / stage 8, power intervention). The continuous reconciliation and conflict resolution work begun immediately afterwards provides for the conflict parties the taking into account of their basic needs of security, participation, identity and a certain improvement in mutual relations. The return of the exiles represents a partial success in resolving the original problems.

4.1.3 Case 3: Cyprus Resettlement Project 1972-74

Development of the conflict

At the start of the Cyprus Resettlement Project (CRP) the conflict has been in a state frozen by a UN peacekeeping deployment. The development and dynamic of the conflict are de-

---

57   See Schulze 1993, pp37-43.

termined by the interests and rivalry of two states (Turkey and Greece) and of the two population groups on Cyprus (join with Greece or division). The states bring their political claims to influence "their" population groups and the intervention rights enshrined in Cyprus' constitution to bear. The freedom to act of decision makers on the island is limited by these conditions.

During the CRP phase there is a stalemate situation or a standstill in the conflict. In 1974 a violent escalation up to war occurs (Table 1: Zartman / column 4 back to column 3; Table 2: Glasl, Debiel / stage 8).

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

The CRP workers intervene with the aim of testing and extending the instruments of civil conflict transformation through a successful conflict resolution. In practical terms, the repatriation of refugees to their villages is to be achieved (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4: "meet basic needs", "improve relationship" with methods such as in Table 1: Glasl / column 4, stages 5-4: mediation, process support). The de-escalating effect of this work during the invasion in 1974 is, thus seen, an unintentional or nonpredictable side-affect of the actual intervention (Table 1: Glasl / escalation of the wider conflict from stage 3-4 to 7).

Composition of the actors

The project group come together from outsiders from the nonviolent movement. Europeans, US-Americans, South Africans and members of Shanti Sena work in the CRP team.

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

The first team clarify the project idea with affected persons (PM); further teams develop details in the form of shuttle diplomacy (PM). The Shanti Sena members carry out a march (PB). Foci of the teams' work are planning and preparation work for the reconstruction of demolished houses and the repatriation of refugees. At short notice a workcamp with Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot youths is organised (PB). During the invasion threatened villagers and members of the workcamp are protected by neighbours and through the CPR team member present - that is, neighbourhood peacekeeping with the support of a third party.

Translation to the process of conflict transformation

The effect of the project can be seen in the success, through mediation, in improving relations between the two ethnic groups (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4: "improve relationship"). Results useful to both sides are reached who develop a less competitive attitude to one another (results of a "de-escalating interaction" following Fisher. Cf. Table 1: Fisher / row 3, column 4). On the level of the ethnic leaders (Top-level on Cyprus), intervention forms at stage 5-6 are used (Table 1: Glasl / column 4: mediation). This makes possible intervention forms such as mediation and process support on the village level (Middle and Grassroots levels) (Table: 1: Glasl / column 4).

The coup, the invasion, and the simultaneous increase in violence in the civilian population encounter a less escalated situation in the village where the CRP workcamp is taking place. There, people are beginning to work on problems together (Table 1: Glasl / stage 5 downwards), and experience that co-operation with the opposing side is possible after all. It could be that these forms of constructive experience re-build the thresholds that are crossed stage by stage in the escalation. This could explain why the inhabitants of this village refuse to use violence ad hoc against their neighbours. Whilst the invading army "offers" so to speak violence against the other ethnic group, the people in the village of the CRP camp insist on treating the persecuted occupants humanely, and work to protect their security and property.

The nonviolent intervention procedure consists of finding a common goal in which both sides have a strong interest. This interest is used, through patient mediatory work, to rebuild communication. Because the intervenors have positive relations to both sides without dictating the issues, the conflict parties gradually regain confidence in the possibility that real problems can be resolved together.

Top-level regional powers and top-level on Cyprus Army versus army	Until 1974 frozen, then escalation to Glasl stage 8
Top-level of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot ethnic leaders	Relations are improved project-related from 6 to 4
Population versus population	Relations and conflict resolving abilites are improved. During the invasion this prevents the escalation in the village of the workcamp from 3 to 4

4.1.4 Case 4: Guatemala Project of Peace Brigades International (PBI) 1983-1996

Development of the conflict

From 1971 to 1982 the guerrillas in Guatemala experience an upturn (Table 1: Zartman / 2nd to 4th phases). From 1980 to 1983 an espcially harsh wave of repression against civil society and the population takes place using "scorched earth tactics" and low-intensity conflict strategies (suppression of rebels through psychological, economic and repressive means) (Table 2: Glasl and Debiel / stage 7). At the same time extensive military operations take place against the "Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca" (URNG) and the population in their areas of influence (Table 2: Glasl / stage 8; Debiel / stages 8-10). Civil society actively supports political and social change through non-military means (nonviolent escalation: protest and resistance). The military's measures lead to a heavy defeat for the guerillas and to a far-reaching destruction of civil society. In 1984/85 there is a deathly quiet; the guerillas are cut off from their support in society.

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

In 1983 PBI react as outsiders to the offer of the military dictator and self-styled president Rios-Montt to observe the "democratic" opening of Guatemala. This makes it possible for PBI to enter the conflict as a third party.

This first project of PBI has as its primary goal the observation of the human rights situation, the escorting of civilians, and reporting, with the aim of preventing violence against the civilian population, supporting nonviolent conflict resolution and of initiating a dialogue between the guerillas, the opposition and the government.

Composition of the actors

PBI is an organisation whose members have experience with nonviolent action and nonviolent intervention. The recruitment and training of volunteers for the team begins with this project.

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

Presence near threatened persons (PK), making rooms available in the project's own house (PK), development projects (later discontinued, PB), human chain at demonstrations (PK), escorting threatened persons (PK), escorting threatened persons to help them overcome

fears caused by traumatic experiences (PB)[58] , increasing emphasis on publicity work (PB and part of PK). Mediation between parties on the middle-level (PM), later only presence at direct talks (PB, and PK, as violence is prevented). Human rights abuses are made public by local groups: presence here (PK). The methods concentrate on escorting, presence and publicity work (PK), beyond that seminars on human rights and overcoming trauma (PB), training in nonviolent action (PB). Presence at organisations, strikes and political actions, e.g. demonstrations, land occupations (PK).

Further devlopment of the conflict and effects of the intervention

After 1987-88 the activities of the guerillas and civil society increase again.[59] In 1987 the first negotiations between the government and the guerillas begin, within the framework of the Esquipulas Peace Treaty. From the start of the 1990s negotiations between URNG and the government under UN mediation are intensified, and the National Commission for Reconciliation is founded. A national dialogue begins in which NGOs such as the "Mutal Support Group for the Relatives of the Disappeared" (GAM) etc., take part. From 1992 direct negotiations take place between URNG and the government. Repression against civil society remains extremely high (Table 2: Glasl / stage 6 and 7).

Translation to the process of conflict transformation

The conflict has been in a state of confrontation for many years; at the same time political power remains imbalanced (Table 1: Lederach / rows 2 and 10, column 3). The attempt by the opposition, with the help of the guerillas (Table 1: Zartman / 1st and 2nd phases) and through political "articulation" and "mobilisation" of civil society developing to nonviolent protest and resistance to achieve change, is met by a war against the guerillas and civil society (Table 2: Glasl and Debiel / stage 7 related to civil society, Glasl / stage 8 and Debiel stage 10 related to the guerillas).

Even after the arrival of PBI the development of civil society remains threatened by violent oppression, and the main task for PBI throughout the project is to contribute to controlling violence. In numerous cases PBI are able to protect persons from the grassroots and middle levels and organisations of civil society from the threat or use of violence. This is done through presence and escorting, by establishing relations to all sides, through an offer of dialogue to the goverment and through informing the international community about the oppression and violence in the country. In the process an increasingly strong co-operation develops between PBI as an outsider group and insiders from civil society who are enabled to represent their interests publicly. The international alert network mobilises in critical situations international publicity which has de facto the power of sanctions at the top-level in Guatemala. The control of violence is supported in this case through the ability to sanction exercised by the intervening groups contacts (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4: "control violence").

PBI's presence also supports the renewed development of a civil opposition from 1984 on, which confronts the powers that be through nonviolent means, re-opening the conflict (Table 1: Lederach / row 10: from "latent" to "overt conflict", with nonviolent resistance and protest also facing violent repression as on stages 7-6 according to Glasl, Table 2). To this end PBI teaches nonviolent action concepts in trainings and knowledge about human rights in seminars.

---

[58]   Mahony/Eugren 1996.
[59]   Sterr 1994, pp. 40-70.

4.1.5 Case 5 / Case 6: Initiative Frieden am Golf (IFAG, Initiative Peace in the Gulf), and Gulf Peace Team (GPT), 1990/1991

Development of the conflict

The international border conflict between Kuwait and Iraq escalates in summer 1990 from Iraqi threats against Kuwait, and reaches with the occupation of Kuwait a new level (Table 2: Glasl / stages 6 to 8). The USA decide not to tolerate this step and build up - using the United Nations - an international anti-Iraq front, which demands an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and threatens with the military "liberation" of Kuwait (Table 1: Glasl, start of a new conflict constellation: Iraq-international community in place of Iraq-Kuwait. Entry at stage 3 with immediate unilateral deployment of troops, escalation between August 1990 and January 1991 up to stage 6). In January 1991 the war against Iraq begins (Table 1: Glasl / stage 7, the military aims to do not target the Iraq centre of power, which remains untouched).

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

In the phase of rapid escalation from stage 3 to 6 the IFAG and GPT intervene nonviolently with the aim of removing the reason for the war and enabling a negotiated solution, by proposing de-escalating steps such as an exchange of hostages (IFAG). The Gulf Peace Team plans to set up several camps between the two front lines as a sign that both sides should stop short of a new armed escalation.

Composition of the actors

The GPT and IFAG grow as spontaneous groups of individuals with a peace movement background. The GPT's interposition idea and the IFAG's idea of an exchange of hostages/presence with the victims have the aim of influencing from the grassroots level the escalation dynamics which is being pushed by the top level of their home countries and power blocks.

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

IFAG: small groups travel from November 1990 into the war-threatened zone (PK). There they intend to fast and pray. The are supported simultaneously in their home countries by groups mobilising against the ongoing war preparations (PB). In Iraq the participants get the chance to meet with selected persons of the middle level and take part in an organisied programme of visits, which they make varied use of. Some take part with their own actions in officially organised demonstrations and human chains. Shortly before the expiry of the ultimatum, appeals are sent from Baghdad to leaders of all sides, including the German government, informing that the line of fire is not free (PK). The German population is called to nonviolent resistance.

After the start of war the activists are evacuated. In response to the missile attacks against Israel a presence there is considered (planned PK). After the end of the war reconstruction work in Iraq is carried out for a year (PB).

GPT: a camp is set up in the desert (PK); appeal is made to military commanders (PK).

Translation to the transformation process of the conflict

IFAG and GPT aim to prevent the transition to a higher stage of escalation (Table 2: Glasl / stage 6 to 7). IFAG attempts to do this by making possible a coalition on the lowest level: through solidarity with the potential victims, who are always and everywhere ordinary peo-

ple. It aims to create relationships from population to population and thereby re-duce/remove support for the war-mongering of the respective governments.

In the activists' home countries the actions of IFAG and information from Iraq help the mobilisation against these countries' participation in the war. However, the bridge-building is unable to prevent the escalation to war. IFAG and GPT are faced with the problem that, especially in international wars, those who make the important decisions often cannot be reached by grassroots initiatives. The anti-war initiatives first have to mobilise a relevant and active minority against the war, whilst expecting to be instrumentalised by the top level. This happens to IFAG both in Iraq and Germany: war propaganda in both countries re-interpret the actions of the peace activist to suit their own ends. It can be assumed that actions whose effect is so indirect (direct grassroots action with grassroots appeal, in order to influence actors on the top level) probably require more time before any results can be expected.

An important result of the IFAG action is that the presence in the threatened area and later in the war-zone makes it possible to obtain authentic information which counteract the official disinformation campaign. The importance of this in future can be seen by considering the fact that the Gulf War brought a new quality of dis- and non-information to war propaganda and disorientation, something which can be expected in future too.[60]

The Gulf Peace Team also aims to prevent the outbreak of war, in as far as the camp between the frontlines aims to question the anti-Iraq alliance's ability to act. The willingness showed by the top-level to escalate the conflict does not face a serious challenge. For this there is a lack of numbers and too little visible neutrality. Because only one camp can be set up in Iraq it is not difficult for war propaganda to doubt the neutrality and moral legitimacy. Whether a larger number of people would actually be able to achieve a de-escalating effect remains an unanswered question.

4.1.6 Case 7: Ecumenical Monitoring Programme for South Africa (EMPSA) 1992-1994

Development of the conflict

The conflict is an innerstate struggle by a majority of the population discriminated against on racist grounds for participation in political power and how this power should be exercised. Since the late 1980s this decades-long open struggle has been in an unstable state of transition from imbalanced to balanced political power (Table 1: Lederach / row 2, comlumn 3 to 4), as the White minority regime can no longer maintain the existing state of affairs (Table 1: Mitchell / column 4 "cost consciousness"). There are negotiations, which are accompanied by increasing violence within and against the population (Table 1: Lederach / row 10, column 3 and 4; simultaneously "negotiation" and "overt conflict"; also there Zartman: both 3rd phase and "standstill"). The level of escalation on the political top level is low, since the interaction lies within the political process. In other segments, however, the level of escalation lies between threat strategy and targeted assassinations which help to intimidate and de-stabilise the political process (Table 2: Glasl / stage 6 and 7; Debiel / stages 5 to 7. The segments "army/police versus population", "within civil society", "civil society against population" and "anonymous repression against population" are most strongly affected by violence.

---

[60]   Cf Liegl/Kempf on the German print media's treatment of the peace movement in the Gulf War.

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

In this transition stage church leaders work first on the issues "edge" by calling for a national peace treaty. The simultaneous increase in violence and the faltering of the negotiations lead them to develop an additional strategy for the other two "edges", above all on the behaviour edge. The EMPSA programme can be seen as a monitoring programme with the strategies PK and PB developed on the middle level by partials and with the aim of monitoring actively and effectively the violence, the transformation process and the elections.

Composition of the actors

The EMPSA programme develops into a medium-term programme of various transnational church organisations and is carried out through international co-operation. It involves short-term teams of church leaders, various experts and individuals from the international solidarity, ecumenical and Anti-Aprtheid movements who are integrated into the locally based and nationally/internationally linked structure of the observation process.

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

A visit by prominent international church leaders opens the programme at the top level (PB and PM for PK). Monitors deployed locally observe the violence on the ground, where they also if needed interpose themselves between the conflict parties (PK), negotiate specific de-escalation solutions for crisis areas (PM for PK), and document attempts to prevent their work (PK). Mass assemblies that form part of the transition process are also monitored (PK, as violence is to be prevented). Leaders from church institutions are sensitised to the monitoring process and to the principles of fair dealing with one another (PM and PB, activating the Middle level). During a second visit the prominent personalities report to top level actors on the results of the monitoring so far; this demonstrates the level of international attention (PK, activating the top level). At the same time, the church representatives repeatedly call on these top level actors to keep the transition process going and not let it slow down (PM). To monitor the elections many additional organisations are activated to send observers (PK, reduction of violence, and PB, election monitoring).

Translation to the transformation process of the conflict

Through its very structure, the intervention touches all levels of society. The churches establish contacts to top and middle levels, urge those responsible to continue the process and make their own proposals. This structure directs the attention from the top to the grassroots level towards controlling violence and continuing the transition process, and an exchange of information from bottom to top is organised.

The various forms of action, from observation, reporting and permanent presence on the ground to visits and crisis intervention etc., cover the whole range of de-escalation at stages 9-6 (cf Diagram 1, De-escalation track) from "control violence", "de-escalate and control hostility" to "meet basic needs/improve relationships". The "issues edge", through the continual demands at the top level, and the "attitudes edge", through peacebuilding activities on the middle and grassroots levels are worked on simultaneously.

As a result the political process can be stabilised, even if the level of violence remains very high (Table 2: remains at Glasl / stage 7). The prevention of a further escalation through continual de-escalating impulses can been seen in our opinion as the most important result of the project.

4.1.7 Case 8: Mir Sada (Peace Now), peace march to Sarajevo in August 1993

Development of the conflict

The civil war in former Yugoslavia is directed from all sides above all in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the very existence of the opposing ethnic group. Particularly the siege of Sarajevo is aimed at the destruction of the multicultural character of the region. The civilian population is affected especially strongly by military actions and threatened by massacres (Table 2: Glasl / stage 8). In this situation more and more groups from the international peace and human rights movement attempt to intervene, as in the case of the Mir Sada project, which is organised from June to August 1993.

Shortly before the start of the march at the beginning of August 1993, military activity begins again in the areas through which the march (or the journey in buses and other vehicles) intends to pass. Violence and destruction escalates. It would be necessary to interrupt these military actions in order to provide safe passage through the disputed area (Table 2: Glasl / stage 8; Debiel / stage 8-9).

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

The initiators set themselves the task of travelling from Split to Sarajevo at the start of August and, once there, to contribute through a stay of several days to a reduction in military action and perhaps to a ceasefire, and to give impetus to a peaceful solution.

Composition of the actors

Mir Sada comes into being ad hoc in early summer 1993 out of discussions of the Verona Forum, in which various European peace groups have worked together since 1992. The action combines and co-ordinates two original action ideas from two separate organisations. From June to August 1993 an organising group from European peace and humanitarian organisations under the leadership of a French and an Italian organisation prepares Mir Sada in the form of a march to Sarajevo. In the various countries peace organisations spread the call to action and prepare the participants. The organisation is carried out by an international ad hoc co-ordination based in Geneva.[61]

Sequence of methods and combination of peace strategies

After a demonstration in Split (protest), two convoys travel, one day after another, from Split towards Sarajevo. In this way, more than two thousand people arrive at the edge of the war zone (PK). Despite threats from local military leaders, individuals travel from here on to Sarajevo, but no longer as part of the Mir Sada project. After a demonstration in Mostar (protest) the overwhelming majority returns to Split.

For those who manage to reach Sarajevo there is a reception in the city. A meeting with representatives of the city, initiatives and citizens' groups take place (PK and PB).

Further demonstrations are held after the action is ended.

Translation to the transformation process of the conflict

Neither the participants nor the organisers are able to clarify whether a ceasefire is possible, due to the pressure of time. The organisers are not prepared for this eventuality (time factor and lack of communication channels to the conflict parties). Various attempts are made to test the seriousness of the threats: negotiations, which are not pursued further; the advance of a small group to a checkpoint and the ultimately successful passage by several vehicles.

---

[61] Perna 1993, p. 14.

By this point the original impulse, which was intended to come from the presence of a large number of people, has disappeared, as most of the participants have followed the organisers' instructions to turn back.

The threat of violence made by the local representatives of the warring parties was sufficient to cause the organisers to turn back almost immediately. The intervention ends at the edge of the war zone; several actions take place later in other places in Croatia.

The exact aim of the action remains open. One goal is to achieve a de-escalation. A further goal concerns the issues, namely to maintain Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state. This goal corresponds to the position of the Bosnian government, so the action can be seen as an act of solidarity with the Bosnian position. Perhaps this is an insoluble conflict of goals. The action is unable to achieve a de-escalating effect.

4.1.8 Case 9: Sjeme Mira (Seeds of Peace), peace march to Mostar in Nov/Dec 1993

Development of the conflict

The open civil war in Bosnia is characterised by a predominantly military approach and a lack of effective political counterbalance. Moreover, the remains of civil society are the target of attacks by the warring parties. This is also the situation in Mostar, where the civilian population on all sides comes under attack from snipers, the muslim population in particular through being trapped in the eastern part of the town, and there is a lack of supplies. At the end of 1993 Mostar is one of the most dangerous places in the Bosnian war zone because of the snipers. The front line has not moved for months and nobody expects any change in the military situation through attacks by one or more of the warring parties. Violence and force rule here, as elsewhere in the country, and those responsible lack the awareness that the continuing violence has a higher price than a search for peace. Thus there is no patt situation or feeling of being trapped in a cul-de-sac (Table 1: Mitchell / column 3; also there: Zartman / column 4). Rather the conflict is in a state of war and destruction (Table 2: Glasl / stage 8; Debiel / stages 8 and 9). The parties are set on wearing down their opponents through continuous attacks.

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

The initiators intend to reach Mostar nonviolently, following the Mir Sada action, which most of them see as having failed. They laso want to be a witness for nonviolence through their presence in both parts of the town; if conditions are good they aim to cross the borderline and call for a ceasefire.

Composition of the actors

Sjeme Mira arises ad hoc as the initiative of individuals and organisations based on an action proposal. Most individuals have previous experience in nonviolent interventions, including in this region.

Sequence of methods, plan, mission and goal

During the journey to West Mostar talks with representatives of the local Croatian authority and military command posts (PB), and public actions (PB, protest) take place. After several attempts, part of the group manages to reach East Mostar with the help of the UNHCR in convoys protected by UN troops. There, this part of the group holds talks (PB) with the other conflict party (Moslems). For a time the group is thus present in both parts of the town and arranges indirect contact between school pupils on both sides (PB). Subsequently

attempts are made to make contact with the population in the Serb-controlled area (PB). On the return journey: visit to a refugee camp (PB).

Translation to the transformation process of the conflict

The intervenors aim is to impress on the warring parties a different - nonviolent - approach through a convincing example. The convincing part lies in accepting personal risk and visibly going to the victims. By behaving thus to all the parties, each of the warring parties can feel themselves accepted as also-victims. Through this relationship work (PB) the group attempts to build up a peacekeeping function and reduce military clashes (call for ceasefire), which is unsuccessful (too few people, too little time).

It proves difficult for the members of Sjeme Mira to overcome the warring parties' fixed images of their opponents as inhuman. The intervention thus starts to work on the parties' mutual images and attitudes, which according to Fisher can be achieved at stages 6-4. The fixation on the inhuman images of the opponents can be explained by the fact that the warring parties are in a situation in which each only wants to be rid of the other(s) (Glasl 7-9). In Fisher's model the nonviolent actors try to improve relations without being able to work simultaneously on the necessities which come before (= "control violence", "de-escalate hostility"). They keep in view the option of moving between the lines, even if, owing to their own lack of time, they do not get as far in their communication with the warring parties that they respond. The shooting of peace activists in Sarajevo and Mostar previously suggests that even if the warring parties agreed in principle to a ceasefire something could still go wrong.

Nevertheless, the possibility of establishing constructive contacts to warring parties in such an escalated situation at all, is itself an achievement, which could be used for further-reaching options aiming at PK activities.

4.1.9 Case 10: Croatia Project of the Balkan Peace Team International (BPTI), 1993-1995/Otvorene Oci (Open Eyes)

Development of the conflict

The conflict situation in Croatia escalates for civil society, which is organised in NGOs, through increasing repression up to threats (Table 2: Glasl / stage 6; Debiel / stage 5). Civil society is in the consolidation and negotiation phase with transitions to the mobilising phase with political pressure (Table 1: Zartman / 1st and 2nd phases). The conflict between the Croatian state and the Serb minority is full of tension, and the UN-monitored ceasefire is repeatedly threatened (Table 2: Glasl / stage 6 to 7; Debiel / stages 5 and 6).

Start of the intervention, plan, mission and goal

The locally installed team aims to contribute through human rights, peace and reconciliation work to a prevention of human rights abuses and a limitation of violence.

Composition of the actors

The Croatia project of BPTI is a co-operation between experienced national and international actors such as War Resisters' International (WRI), Peace Brigades International (PBI) and the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) as the international nonviolent networks, and the Mouvement pour une alternative nonviolence (MAN) or the Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (BSV) as national organsations. BSV, MAN, IFOR and WRI are organisations with a background that includes concepts for social defence. The Brethren Volunteer Service is, among others, an organisation with many years experience in volunteer

service. The BPTI as an outsiders values highly co-operation with insiders (NGOs of civil society).

Sequence of methods, plan, mission and goal

The first team observe court cases against members of the opposition or minorities (PB) and document human rights abuses against Serbs living in Croatian areas and members of the opposition (PB). They contribute to the setting-up of networks and coalitions, work on information exchange and help with refugee work. An NGO database is set up and, on a small level, material and logistical help is provided (PB).

Team members hold meetings with official representatives (PM) and escort activists in difficult situations (PK). They support the networking of trainers, organise round tables on a local level, and encourage communal conflict resolution projects (PB). They put pressure on the authorities (PK when to reduce violence, PM when to maintain human rights) through fact-finding journeys to Western Slavonia and Dubrovnik and the Krajina (fact-finding for long-term PK, report is PM).

Further activities include reports for international organisations, such as the Hague War-Crimes Tribunal (PB), regular presence at projects in areas of tension, presence at house evictions (PK). Team members observe trials on "enemy activity" and compile an appeal to the constitutional court concerning such trials (PB). They perform mediation (PM) and give support (PB) to new offices of the human rights movement in areas of tension (PB and PK, since they give protection).

During military offensive they monitor the situation and directly afterwards they organise presence and the escort of threatened persons (PK).

Further development of the conflict and effects of the intervention

The threats and attacks against the developing civil society and the Serbs still living in Croatia remain at a high level during the intervention and require a continuous international presence (Table 2: Glasl / stages 6-7). After exploratory missions and together with organisations of civil society the team organises monitoring of the situation after the military re-take Western Slavonia and the Krajina, and maintains a regular presence there (Table 2: Glasl stage 7-8).

Translation to the transformation process of the conflict

The BPTI project plays a strongly supportive role in civil society's development of articulation and conflict resolution abilities (peacebuilding: empowerment through seminars and networking). Presence in situations of direct conflict protects against political repression. Reporting on an (inter)-national level on violence and human rights abuses increases to a certain extent pressure on state authorities (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4: "control violence" and "de-escalate and control hostility").

During the military offensives the BPTI assumes the role of monitor, in individual cases also the protection of threatened persons. The BPTI intervention is thus also aimed at nonviolent peacekeeping in order to limit hostilities against civil society (Table 1: Fisher / row 5, column 4: "control violence").

5 Discussion of criteria for success and determination of the scope of the interventions

We see the cases studied here as attempts to exert influence on a conflict. At the same time they are the expression of a particular understanding of the conflict and also an attempt to act in the political and social fields. What constitutes the success of such actions is determined in very different ways, depending on which categories are considered to be most important. This aspect must be taken into account in order to do justice to nonviolent interventions.

5.1   Reaching the aims set as a criterion for success

If we first ask to what extent the activists succeeded in making progress in the areas in which they themselves set goals, then four cases show success in all areas: 2 (Shanti Sena), 3 (CRP), 7 (EMPSA) and 10 (BPTI). The BPTI is unable to achieve a reduction of violence in Western Slavonia and the Krajina, but this was not one of the original goals, since it has been developed as an option during the project. The "Peace Mission" and the "Observer Team" in case 1 (Nagaland) can claim progress in almost all areas. Only the goal of supporting the problem solving remained unfulfilled. In case 4 (PBI), progress can be seen in all of the intended areas apart from the initiation of a dialogue between the guerrillas and the government. In case 9 (Sjeme Mira) the hope of prompting a ceasefire remains unfulfilled.

In three case, no progress on the self-set goals is made: case 5 (IFAG), case 6 (GPT) and case 8 (Mir Sada).

An evaluation of the cases shows that, in addition to the intended effects, side effects occur that are relevant to the conflict process or to the activists' environment. These are summarized in the following table:

Table 4: Unintended results/side effects:

Case	negative:	positive:
1.Nagaland	unknown	unknown
2.Shanti Sena	Unknown	unknown
3.CRP	Unknown	Turkish Cypriots in the village of the workcamp do not suffer attack during the invasion
4.PBI	Unknown	unknown
5.IFAG 6.GPT	Unknown	mobilizes the anti-war movement in home countries
7.EMPSA	Unknown	The monitoring process itself becomes part of the transformation process
8.Mir Sada	In part the action leads to de-motivation, but also to critical questioning of mass interpositioning actions and the possible endangering of civilians and soldiers in central Bosnia through such actions	leads to improvement of such actions (Sjeme Mira directly afterwards)
9.Sjeme Mira	Unknown	unknown
10.BPTI	Unknown	unknown

Case 8, Mir Sada, shows clearly that the actors in a conflict area have to consider, beyond the danger to themselves, the threat to persons directly or indirectly in contact with the project. Cases 5 (IFAG) and 6 (GPT) support the surrounding anti-war movement. Such effects cannot be fitted into our success framework, and the reason for this may be that these effects have been achieved not as third parties but as conflict parties on the grassroots level. The case of Mir Sada is contradictory, as a sustained de-motivation caused by such a project can undermine the ability of civil actors to act in future.

5.2 De-escalation on the behavior level as a criterion for success

For the assessment of the cases' successes relating to de-escalation and constructive handling of the conflict we draw on the criteria which Bercovitch has compiled for mediation processes and which he relates solely to the behavior level[62]. In this sense, interventions should be considered as successful when they cause a "considerable positive change" in the control of the conflict and the interaction of the conflict parties. Cases 1 (Naga) and 2 (Shanti Sena) can be judged as successful, as both these projects show a sustained effect on the whole conflict. Cases 4 (PBI) and 10 (BPTI, even if it seems too early for a final assessment) show such an effect on the behavior level at least in individual segments of civil society. Case 7 (EMPSA) is effective in this sense on a local level where monitors are present. Interventions can be assessed as "partially successful" if they lead to "negotiations and dialogue". This assessment can be applied to project 3 (CRP), as it leads to direct talks and agreements which are then not implemented due to the invasion. As no attacks against threatened persons take place in the village, the interaction between the parties seems improved. However, these local events have no effect on the whole conflict, so we do not consider this case to have overall success. "Limited success" can be attributed to interventions that achieve "a ceasefire or interruption of hostilities". When interventions show "no visible or demonstrable influence on the conflict or the parties' behavior" then they are to be judged as failed. Mir Sada, Sjeme Mira, IFAG and GPT fall into this category.

5.3 De-escalation on the behavior, attitude and issues levels

Bercovitch's criteria seem too narrow to capture the de-escalation process as a whole. We have attempted to find, in the sources available to us, indications of changes on the attitudes and issues levels and in the mobilization of further persons for constructive conflict handling. In this way we hope to include changes to the central areas of the conflict dynamic. We have related these effects to the various edges of the conflict pyramid, to produce the following tables:

---

[62]   Bercovitch 1995, p94.

Table 5: Effects on the issues of the conflict

Case:	partially visible effect:	no visible effect:
1.Nagaland	The political problem of independence becomes less important for many. The opposition comes to terms with the situation and participates increasingly in the political process	
2.Shanti Sena	The expulsions are partly reversed	
3.CRP	The repatriation process can begin	
4.PBI	Knowledge of and work for human rights is imparted in seminars	
5.IFAG	unknown	X
6.GPT	unknown	
7.EMPSA	contribution to forming the stages of power transfer	
8.Mir Sada	unknown	X
9.Sjeme Mira	unknown	X
10.BPTI	Probable in individual cases, through reports and appeals to Croatian authorities	

Table 6: Effects on the behavior of the actors

Case:	Use of violence restricted:	Use of violence ceases:	political activity raised:	communication improved:	no visible effect:
1.Nagaland	X	X	X		
2.Shanti Sena	X	X	X		
3.CRP	X			X	
4.PBI	X		X		
5.IFAG					X
6.GPT					X
7.EMPSA	X				
8.Mir Sada		unclear			X
9.Sjeme Mira					X
10.BPTI	X		X		

Table 7: Effects on the attitudes of the actors

Case:	Top:	Middle:	Grassroots:	no visible effect:
1.Nagaland	mutual under-standing, good will, personal reconciliation	(ditto)	(ditto)	
2.Shanti Sena		Understanding, trust, willingness to reconcile	(ditto)	
3.CRP		Understanding, trust, willingness to reconcile	(ditto)	
4.PBI	Exchange of information	Exchange of information, human rights seminar, help overcoming traumatic experiences	(ditto)	
5.IFAG/6. GPT			Strengthening of anti-war movement	Top and Middle levels not reached
7.EMPSA		Police leaders willing to talk, Inkatha leaders willing to co-operate, helpful suggestions in escalated situations	Churches' "trust credit" leads to willingness to accept monitors' suggestions	
8.Mir Sada			Applause of individual observers	
9.Sjeme Mira			Willingness to take risks legitimizes the message; openness towards all victims (visits to all sides) provokes fixed enemy images. Despite this, good reception for the symbolic actions	
10.BPTI	Information exchange	Increased co-operation and security	(ditto)	

5.4 Effects on non-participants

The projects have very different effects on the behavior and attitudes on non-acting insiders and outsiders.

Table 8: Effects on the attitudes of non-actors

1. Nagaland	Parts of the population in Nagaland develop greater trust in the political process.
2. Shanti Sena	Encourages the city dwellers.
3. CRP	unknown
4. PBI	Encourages threatened persons and organizations. International organizations become more aware of civil society.
5. IFAG 6.GPT	unknown
7. EMPSA	Encouragement within the population.
8. Mir Sada	unknown
9. Sjeme Mira	Persons around the activists are sensitized to the project and the conflict.

10. BPTI	International organizations are more aware of civil society.

Table 9: Effects on the behavior of non-actors

Case:	Mobilization against war:	Increased participation in the political process or in the project:	No visible effect:
1. Nagaland		X	
2. Shanti Sena		X	
3. CRP		X	
4. PBI		X	
5. IFAG	X		
6. GPT	X		
7. EMPSA		X	
8. Mir Sada			unknown
9. Sjeme Mira			unknown
10.BPTI		X	

Aspects such as changes in attitudes are hard to assess empirically. Despite the fact that our evaluation in such a study remained by necessity fairly shallow, we have found so many indications of such changes that we consider them sufficient to present for discussion here. Detailed studies will be able to gain better insight into this question, and it seems useful to develop suitable evaluation criteria in order to search directly for such changes. They make it possible to transfer the complex dynamic of a conflict to the escalation and de-escalation track.

5.5 De-escalation track as a criterion of success

In the following we place the cases in order of success, whereby this only relates to the aspect of "success" in which this study is most interested, namely, how nonviolent interventions can achieve the greatest possible effect in de-escalating and dealing constructively with a conflict. The level of escalation should be reduced as much as possible in many segments. Not all the contributing activities must necessarily be those of the intervenors: some may result from close co-operation with "civilizing forces" in the conflict area. We have sorted the cases according to the following criteria:

1. Is a sustainable de-escalation of the whole conflict achieved, and by how many levels is the conflict de-escalated?
2. On which edges of the pyramid and on which levels are effects visible? Can the de-escalation track be identified?
3. How many segments of society are affected by the intervention?
4. In what way is the ability of the conflict parties to deal with conflict strengthened?

According to these criteria we have distributed points to the cases, and the totals produce the order of success. For a successful de-escalation at stages 9-5 (re-entry into the political process) there is one point per stage. One point each is given for successes of work in the framework of the peace strategies, such as setting up a dialogue with all the conflict parties, sustainable control of violence, work to overcome the divisions in society, reconciliation, and progress in problem solving. The assessment of the segments allows one point for each of the levels affected (top, middle or grassroots). As we view "conflict" as a transformation process whose resolution is basically desirable, we value highly the constructive element of strengthening the ability to deal with conflict, and have thus allowed one point for successes in this area.

Table 10: Cases studied ranked in order of success

Order	Case:	De-escalation (Table 2):	Successful effects:	Which segments are affected?	Conflict ability:	Points:
I.	1. Nagaland	Whole conflict from 8 to 5 and sustainable stabilization at 6-7 (in segments population and civil society from 6 to 4) ●●	Sustainable control of violence through ceasefire. Work on divisions in society, more sustainable on middle and grassroots levels ●●	All segments of state and society in Nagaland ●●●	Empowerment of civil society ●	8
II.	2. Shanti Sena	Whole conflict from 7 to 4 ●●	Reconciliation and problem solving related to return of exiles ●●	All segments of an Indian city (middle and grassroots levels) ●●	Empowerment of civil society ●	7
II.	4. PBI	In the segment civil society from 8 to 6 ●●	Sustainable control of violence in civil society where PBI is active ●	Top leaders as dialogue partners, middle and grassroots leaders in civil society ●●●	Empowerment on middle and grassroots level with the affect that opposition can express itself again (Lederach from 1 to 2, first phase of Zartman) ●	7
III.	5. EMPSA	Stabilization of violence at stage 7 ●	Prevention of further escalation ●	Top leaders as dialogue partners, Middle and Grassroots leaders from civil society ●●●	Sustainable support for the political process through impetuses for fair behavior and constructive problem solving on all levels ●	6
III.	10. BPTI	Control of segment civil society 6 to 4 ●	Control of violence in segment of civil society where team is active ●	Top leaders as dialogue partners, Middle and Grassroots leaders in civil society ●●●	Empowerment to articulate opposition and form structures of civil society ●	6
IV.	3. CRP	Segment of the conflict from 6 to 4-5, with transitions to 3 in village communities. Prevention of escalation from 3-4 to 7 in the village ●	Sustainable stabilization of an already achieved de-escalation as side affect of reconciliation and problem-solving work ●	Top leaders on the island, Grassroots in villages ●●		4

V.	9. Sjeme Mira	not demonstrable	Setting-up of constructive communication to almost all local conflict parties ●	Middle leaders from civil society as dialogue partners in Mostar, population in Mostar through public actions ●		2
VI.	5. IFAG 6. GPT	not demonstrable not demonstrable	Symbol of reconciliation, warning of war	Protest and resistance movement in Gulf Allies countries		
VII.	8. Mir Sada	not demonstrable	Mobilization of many people to the edge of a war-zone	Local military leaders, population in the region of the action		

6. The combination of peace strategies as a characteristic of process-oriented nonviolent interventions

The case studies show on the one hand very clearly how in some projects the individual methods of the different peace strategies overlap and at times run parallel to one another. On the other hand there are cases which restrict themselves to implementing one peace strategy. Some focus on a single action of one peace strategy and apply the others more in addition. In some cases external circumstances call for a change of strategy. The following picture of the combination of the peace strategies gives an overview of the projects. The entries in the priority columns show clearly where the focus of the individual projects lies:

Table 11: Combination and overlap of the peace strategies

Case:	1st priority	2nd priority	3rd priority
1. Nagaland	PK	PM	PB
2. Shanti Sena	PB	PM	PK
3. CRP	PM	PB	PK (unintentional)
4. PBI	PK	PB	PM
5. IFAG	PK		
6. GPT			
7. EMPSA	PK	PM	PB
8. Mir Sada	PK	PB (option)	
9. Sjeme Mira	PB	PK (option)	
10. BPTI	PB	PM	PK

The table shows that nonviolent interventions do not automatically combine the peace strategies. We can insofar correct our starting hypothesis that a combination is rather a consequence of the aims of the project, which can be either more action-oriented or more process-oriented. In primarily action-oriented interventions the actors are concerned with carrying out a previously agreed action. As a rule this happens through the choice of a particular method, e.g. march, interposition, etc. Examples of this approach are Mir Sada, Gulf Peace Team, IFAG, and to a certain extent Sjeme Mira. These action-oriented interventions also aim to affect the conflict, but the decisions about the form of action are taken before the start.

Deployments whose aims are primarily process-oriented are inherently able to develop differently, as in our context they respond to the conflict dynamic. In these more process-oriented interventions the description of the activities is initially somewhat vague. The methods used are developed during the deployment and are planned so as to support or initiate a peace process. In these cases we usually find a combination of peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities, sometimes linked to peacemaking. Examples of this approach are the Nagaland, EMPSA, PBI and BPTI. The interventions which were most able to produce a de-escalating effect seem to have done so through an integrated use of the three strategies.

Process-oriented projects could be developed further through a greater use of peacemaking activities that would build up continuous pressure on the "issues edge".

The combination of peace strategies is not only relevant for nonviolent interventions: it is of general importance. Generalizing, we would say that the more the peace strategies are planned and used separately from one another, the more difficult it is to make progress using civil means alone.

But even peacekeeping through military means has its limits, as for example UN military deployments show. If the strategies are pursued strictly one after another instead of being combined, then the chance for their success is restricted. Cases 2 (Shanti Sena) and 3 (CRP) show that the military and UN troops respectively are at most able to maintain the status quo. But to bring the conflict back from stage 7 to stage 6, peacekeeping alone is insufficient. The project in Cyprus demonstrates how peacebuilding and peacemaking can revitalize the frozen state of peacekeeping.

7.The significance of further criteria for nonviolent interventions

In the literature on conflict resolution a number of conditions that influence the chances of de-escalation attempts have been discussed. We have compared the empirical data with four such conditions and tried to establish relationships between the relative success of each case and the specific condition.

7.1   Conflict type

Here we distinguish between interventions in interstate and in intrastate wars. Most of our cases take place in intrastate conflicts, although that is a result of our selection. The cases correspond to the current development of conflict in recent years[63] . Cases 5 (IFAG) and 6 (GPT) intervene in an interstate conflict. From the point of view of the Naga Resistance the "Peace Mission" in case 1 (Nagaland) too. The Yugoslavian civil war, which contains both elements, is attended to by cases 8, 9 and 10 (Mir Sada, Sjeme Mira, BPTI).

All other conflicts are intrastate conflicts, including civil wars with strong external power interests, as is Cyprus (Greece/Turkey) and in Nagaland (India, partly also China). EMPSA in South Africa and the Nagaland conflict (within the Nagas) are both concerned with the division of power within the state. Cases 4 and 10 (PBI and BPTI) represent intrastate repression of parts of civil society. Case 2 (Shanti Sena) is concerned with a violent social conflict.

A comparison of the cases studied shows that most of them take place on a social, intrastate level. The violence is committed either by state organs or civil war armies and militias against the civilian population, or by parts of the population against each other. They all contain a strong ethno-political component.[64] Owing to the small number of cases analyzed here, it is not possible to state anything about the relationship between the conflict type and the chance of success.

7.2   Stage of escalation at the start of the intervention and differentiation according to "segment".

Here it is necessary to distinguish between the point at which the call or invitation to act occurs and the point at which the project begins on site. There can often be a decisive delay. In addition, the level of escalation as a whole must be determined, as different segments of society can be at different stages. The deciding factor for the escalation stage at the start of the intervention is the level in the segment in which the intervention takes place. Arranging the cases according to Glasl (Table 2) and in order of escalation, we produce the following picture:

At the lowest stage of escalation, between 4 and 5 (Table 2: Glasl), we find the CRP. The deciding factor here is that in the village where the project is working the conflict between the ethnic groups does not escalate although the total conflict escalates to stage 8 (Table 2: Glasl) during the invasion.

---

[63]   Ropers 1995, pp. 5-8.
[64]   On this question see ibid, pp. 8-29.

Case 10 (BPTI) also starts at a relatively early stage of escalation: stage 5 to 6 concerning the civilian population, but up to stages 7 to 8 later in the Krajina against the Serb population (Table 2: Glasl).

Five cases start at the transition from stage 6 to 7 (Table 2: Glasl) from threats to the deliberate use of violence: 2 (Shanti Sena), 4 (PBI), 5 (IFAG), 6 (GPT) and 7 (EMPSA).

The remaining three interventions start at stage 8 (Table 2: Glasl): 1 (Nagaland), 8 (Mir Sada) and 9 (Sjeme Mira).

The precise stage of escalation does not seem fundamental to the intervention's success. At first this seems a surprising result, as it contradicts the common assumption that the chances of a successful intervention reduce with increasing escalation. This contradiction can be explained by taking the scope of the intervention into account. The three most successful interventions (Table 10): 1 (Nagaland), 2 (Shanti Sena) and 4 (PBI) begin at a high level of escalation. In case 1 (Nagaland) a reduction in the level of escalation of the whole conflict is achieved, likewise in case 2 (Shanti Sena). The other cases work in specific segments. PBI has a sustainable de-escalating effect but only in the segment where the teams are active.

Only if we accept that even a de-escalating effect in one single segment counts it is possible to maintain the claim that in highly escalated conflicts a real chance exists of achieving a de-escalation through nonviolent intervention. This is the only way, in our opinion, in which the individual cases and their effects can be understood and the limits of nonviolent intervention determined.

The more segments of a society in conflict can be influenced by an intervention, the more sustainable the de-escalating effect can be. If this supposition is true, then the way to improve interventions becomes clear: broaden the range of activities, perhaps through cooperation and division of work with other intervenors, and thus concentrate and intensify the de-escalating effect.

7.3   Timing and maturity of the conflict

According to Kriesberg and Zartman[65] (Table 1: Zartman / column 4), a favorable time for the start of an intervention is a stalemate, or the time when the conflict parties become aware of the costs involved in a protracted escalation (Table 1: Mitchell / column 4). From the sources available it is not possible to assess for certain whether this situation applies to any of the cases studied here. To do so would require individual case studies of the sort carried out by Stedman for Zimbabwe[66] . Cost awareness exists at least in one or some of the conflict parties in case 1 (Nagaland, in the Resistance and on the government side), in case 4 in Guatemala within the opposition and in case 10 in Croatia within civil society. Several of the projects begin at explicitly unfavorable times, as in the case of the actions of the Gulf Peace Team and the Initiative Frieden am Golf, which run into the ongoing war preparations and have to work against the top actors' explicitly active will to escalate. In the case of Mir Sada the military constellation changes just before the action, and the suddenly increased hopes of a NATO attack make the idea of a march to Sarajevo seem even counterproductive to local supporters.

Several cases start just before a threatened new round of escalation: 1 (Nagaland), 5 (IFAG), 6 (GPT), 7 (EMPSA), 8 (Mir Sada) and 10 (BPTI). Two projects start just after a violent escalation has ended: 2 (Shanti Sena) through the military intervention, and 4 (PBI) after the murder of many opposition members in Guatemala. In two cases, 3 (CRP) and 9

---

[65]   Kriesberg 1991 and Zartman 1991.
[66]   Stedman 1988.

(Sjeme Mira) it is not possible to determine whether the escalation process and the exact state of the conflict influence the time or other essential elements of the intervention.

Relating these results to the degree of success produces no clear picture, but rather a hypothesis to be tested in further case studies: a stalemate is by all means a supporting element, and an explicit will or option to escalate on the part of the warring parties an impeding element, especially if no influence on this aspect can be exerted; the threat of a worsening of the situation, as far as the parties are aware of it, can correspondingly increase the chance of a successful intervention. But even in situations of military "stabilization" of a conflict state there can be openings for nonviolent interventions, as cases 2 (Shanti Sena) and 3 (CRP) show.

7.4   The societal level of an intervention

The definition of three different levels of society (top/middle/grassroots) introduced by Lederach is for us a very helpful means for determining the scope of nonviolent interventions and defining possibilities for improvement. Our theory is that the chance of a most comprehensive effect on the conflict as a whole increases depending on the extent to which the intervention (or a force working for peace, the intervention may be part of) manages to install stable and constructive approaches and communication channels on as many societal levels as possible. Put simply: the more levels can be approached effectively and involved in a communication process, the greater the scope of the intervention.

The following interventions are able to work on all three levels: 1 (Naga), 3 (CRP, up to the Cypriot top level), 4 (PBI, in Guatemala on the top level indirectly through the emergency networks and directly through a continuous dialogue), and in addition 7 (EMPSA), and 10 (BPTI).

The Middle and Grassroots levels are touched on by 2 (Shanti Sena), 8 (Mir Sada) and 9 (Sjeme Mira).

Cases 5 (IFAG) and 6 (GPT) are special cases, as they aim to influence the top level by reducing support for the war on the middle and grassroots levels in their home countries. The IFAG at least attempts to build a symbolic bridge between the grassroots level on both sides. A direct contact or line of communication to the top level cannot be created effectively; this is partly even prevented by the belligerent states.

We can summarize that the clearest relationships between the projects' success and the criteria discussed so far can be seen in the last two: the societal levels approached and the question of the timing of the intervention and/or the willingness of the conflict parties to change.

7.5   The basic conditions: "inherent abilities", "situation/time factor", "restrictions by third parties"

We now discuss some basic conditions that appear to us to be further individual factors beyond the conflict dynamics and the setting of goals that can also have a decisive effect on a project's scope. The "inherent abilities" of the intervenors are above all the ability to mobilize sufficient resources for the task and set up an effective working structure. The term "situation/time factor" denotes those sudden changes in the conflict situation that can lead to the intervenors needing to abandon their existing plans and change their strategy. Finally, there are the formal means of power that further parties or even the conflict parties them-

selves can use against potential and acting intervenors in order to deflect them from their aims or to instrumentalize them. We have called this factor "restrictions by third parties".

Including these handicaps in our evaluation, some successes seem to have occurred despite quite unfavorable conditions and some unreached goals are more easily explained by the circumstances. At the same time, we can define several areas relevant to the actions that the intervenors cannot influence (time factor, change in the situation), perhaps partially influence (restrictions by third parties) and that only the intervenors can influence (inherent abilities). In detail the following can be determined:

Table 12: Basic conditions relevant to the success of nonviolent interventions

Case:	Situation/time factor	inherent abilities	restrictions by third parties
1. Nagaland	The delay caused by the death of two ruling state presidents led to the talks on an agreement on the issues taking place in much worsened conditions. This de-stabilized the ceasefire and made the Observer Team necessary.	unknown	The British member of the Peace Mission, Michael Scott, is deported by the Indian government. Following bomb attacks in Assam which are connected with the resistance, the member from Assam, Chaliha, can longer take part in the Peace Mission. This is then dissolved. The work of the Observer Team is ended in 1972 by the Indian government.
2. Shanti Sena	unknown	Limitations due to a poor structure on site. Only a few members are mobilized. Means of communication and travel are lacking. The great geographical distance delays arrival in the riot areas.	unknown
3. CRP	unknown	The lack of resources for the project delays the project being carried out and affects the form of deployment and the timeline. Instead of a presence on the island, only travelling teams are deployed, of which one stays for three months.	Hoped-for financial means are not made available by the Greek-Cypriot government. The Turkish invasion ends the project.
4. PBI	The originally planned return of refugees and dialogue between the government and the guerrillas only begins on the 1990s. By this time PBI has developed a different focus and concentrates on escorting threatened persons and presence in civil society.	Poor resources and lack of volunteers mean that requests from groups cannot be answered positively and no teams can be sent to other places. This weakens the breadth of action possibilities and restricts the effectiveness of the presence.	Visa politics; threats to the teams and to team members; threat of and carrying out of deportation following certain forms of action.
5. IFAG 6.GPT	The announcement by Iraq that hostages are to be released takes away part of the aims of the first IFAG group to travel to Baghdad. The GPT is - also due to the quick escalation - only able to set up one camp	The development of the action calls into question the original condition of neutrality (e.g. camps on all sides). In addition, organizational difficulties arise, also in co-operation with other organizations, as the large international NGO-networks do not join. Presumably because of lack of volunteers, communication difficulties and financial limitations.	No permission for a camp from the Saudi Arabian government. This strengthens dependence on Iraq and call GPT's neutrality into question. The GPT in Iraq is not allowed at the intended site but hundreds of kilometers from the border. IFAG and GPT: the Iraqi government decides on the end of

			the volunteers' presence
7. EMPSA	unknown	The size of the preparation groups is limited by the fact that the supporting organizations only have limited personnel resources.	unknown
8. Mir Sada	Heavy fighting is taking place in the planned transit area.	Insufficient logistics, lack of detailed knowledge of the situation and the geography of the area, no alternatives for the case that the route is blocked. Unclear communication and decision-making. National groups do not manage to co-ordinate or make a clear political statement. Far fewer than the promised 10 000 participants.	The representatives of the USA, Italy and France in Split surprisingly declare their "refusal" of the project. At the front, "serious problems" are threatened against a continued journey.
9. Sjeme Mira	unknown	The number of 200 participants envisaged in the flyer is not realized, and a further 50 announced participants drop out at short notice without replacement.	Delays to the journey at control posts, which makes negotiations over the right to stay and travel permits necessary and which also partly restricts these.
10. BPTI		Poor resources and lack of volunteers mean that no further teams can be set up in other places. This weakens the breadth of possible actions and limits the effectiveness of the presence.	The Croatian military action means that projects in Western Slavonia and the Krajina cannot be set up and no presence is possible when the escalation takes place, only monitoring.

7.6   Learning processes in nonviolent interventions as a criterion

One last criterion should not be overlooked in the evaluation of actions undertaken by civilian actors from social movements. The competence to act is gained through direct experience, and this inherently includes learning from mistakes. An important criterion is thus to what extent a transfer of experience takes place, that is, whether actions increase the repertoire of actions and lead to new competence, either through dissociating oneself from previous experience or through extending or complementing the same. In this sense the actions that perhaps set their goals too high, as far as the possible effect on the conflict is concerned, gain a different status. The Gulf Peace Team and the IFAG re-vitalized the idea of a presence between the front lines first formulated in the 1930s as a "Peace Army", and challenged decision-makers at the top level with a thus far undared directness to re-consider the path to war.

The interventions in former Yugoslavia are characterized by learning from very different and partly evaluated experiences, in which Mir Sada and Sjeme Mira - themselves part of a long chain of interventions - are to be seen. Sjeme Mira set itself the goal of being (or becoming) a nonviolent action in a war zone and able to act at all. The fact that this action is possibly an important contribution to an understanding of how nonviolent interventions can begin to establish constructive communication to the conflict parties and thus create a basis for further options, is only the result of this reflection.

The "learning line" that stretches from Peace Brigades International to BPTI is already almost "established" and their experiences are widely used within social movements. The nearly 15-year experience of PBI characterizes the conception, methodology and experience

of the BPTI, whereby here, too, adjustments and further developments take place, although a rich history of action and organizational repertoire is drawn on.

8 Summary: the basic mechanism of nonviolent interventions; supporting and hindering conditions

At the close of this evaluation we return to our original question and present the results collected in the form of a number of hypotheses. The starting question is: how and for what reasons can nonviolent interventions develop a de-escalating effect, since they are unable or unwilling to use violent instruments of power and rely instead only on indirect means of coercion? In order to answer this question, it is helpful to concentrate on the conflict dynamics and on the three levels (top, middle and grassroots), in order to identify the kind of activities of the intervenor. We can note firstly that the actors in nonviolent interventions build up positive relations to the conflict parties and through this establish communication about the reality of the conflict as they observe it. The messages thus conveyed question about the legitimacy of the individual parties' current conflict behavior and the validity of their intended solution of the problem. The existence of a third party at the scene of events makes it easier for the conflict parties to take a more constructive approach to behavior and problem-solving. A reversal of the escalation becomes possible because the conflict parties question their own conflict behavior and are supported in their search for a different approach to the problem. This apparently basic mechanism of nonviolent interventions does not function unconditionally.

The analysis of a number of criteria allows us to formulate several supporting conditions related to the conflict parties, the structure of the society affected by the conflict and to the intervenors which can aid the process of reversing the escalation.

Supporting conditions related to the conflict parties are:
➢ as many as possible of the conflict parties are aware of the costs that the current violent behavior create. The intervening groups partly raise these costs, and/or help to make the parties aware of them;
➢ the intention or willingness to change the current status quo on the part of the conflict parties exists or can be awakened.

A supporting condition related to the structure of society in conflict is:
➢ elements of and structures in civil society exist that are independently committed to an integration of the conflict parties in a peaceful conflict resolution and with whom a long-term co-operation is possible.

A supporting condition in the international surroundings of the conflict is:
➢ authorities and institutions of civil society on an international level declare their active and responsible support for a process of peaceful conflict resolution (e.g. scientists, former politicians, also Quaker organizations or the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Peace Brigades International as international NGO at the UN or regional organizations such as the OSCE, etc.).

Supporting conditions related to the intervenors are:

- they possess a long-term willingness to commit themselves, and are able to build up reliable, stable, positive relations to the conflict parties;
- They apply and adapt their methods flexibly and in response to the situation, and are able to change their strategy;
- they have or can establish access to the decision-makers;
- they are able, without influencing the issues of the conflict, to influence continuously the willingness and ability of the conflict parties to resolve the problem.

Similarly, several conditions can be defined which strongly limit and/or prevent the de-escalating effect of nonviolent interventions, if such an effect is intended. These are:
- the conflict parties' absolute intention or willingness to escalate exists, and cannot be influenced;
- no relevant contact can be established
- the time available is too short and/or the reliability of the commitment is lacking.

In this study we have inquired what contribution nonviolent interventions can make to optimizing the peace strategies peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. In particular we have discovered the de-escalating effect of process-oriented intervention projects and have attempted to describe this phenomenon in terms of conflict theory. We see this exercise as a first attempt to bring nonviolent projects into the discussion about civilian conflict resolution, and can ultimately present more conjectures and suppositions than results. However, the importance and potential for development of nonviolent interventions seem to justify further discussion.

9 Conclusions and further questions for research

9.1   Possible practical conclusions

We have stated some first conclusions and suppositions on how orientation and action within a conflict can be made easier and better directed. The concepts of the conflict dynamic pyramid and the escalation and de-escalation tracks are those which we particularly wish to offer for discussion.

In our opinion working with the "escalation track" makes an exact orientation in the conflict dynamics possible, allowing to determine the current state of a conflict. Subsequently, suitable de-escalating and helpful interventions can be defined. The idea of a de-escalation "track" helps this process. This track defines certain main interventions for specific phases of a conflict, making possible a sustainable stabilization and improvement of the conflict. The conflict dynamic pyramid allows to locate within the overall conflict points of departure and action steps for oneself as well as for one's co-operation partners and thus to estimate their expected scope.

As our study demonstrates, there are various different aims nonviolent interventions can pursue. We believe that the considerations in this study allow the development of a simple diagnostic instrument for practitioners aiming to achieve a de-escalating effect with their interventions.

9.2   Further questions for research

Apart from the need to carrying out scientific research on the activities of civil actors much more comprehensively than has been done so far and to incorporate them into conflict theory, that is to take reality into account, while performing this study we have noticed the following gaps in research:

1. Nonviolence as an escalating power-oriented action concept is not taken into account in conflict theory. A reappraisal of the Indian independence struggle from this viewpoint would be just a fruitful as the investigation of possible connections between racist laws and Martin Luther King's nonviolent campaigns. This would result in an evaluation of two productive cases of nonviolent campaigns on the interstate and intrastate levels.

2. Escalation and de-escalation stages need to be more accurately differentiated so that terminology for changes in various segments can be found and interventions on a smaller scale described.

3. If our supposition is valid, namely that it is the constructive relations to all conflict parties that give the intervenors sufficient authority to influence the conflict parties' violent behavior, then it is necessary to explain how the intervenors cut out the mechanism by which the parties in highly escalated conflicts are only able to perceive newly-arrived actors in terms of friend or foe. A starting point could be corresponding observations by Glasl.[67]

---

[67] Glasl 1990, on social infection, pp155-182, on the various levels cf. pp242-245, 256f, 270, 276.

10 Bibliography

10.1 General literature

Akdogan, Argun A., "White man's burden" revitalized: An eclectic approach to the myth of humanitarian intervention with particular reference to Somalia, p. 1-18, in: Calließ/Merkel 1993. (Akdogan 1993)

Albrecht, Ulrich, Stellungnahme des Sachverständigen Prof. Dr. U.Albrecht. Antworten auf den Fragenkatalog zur Anhörung "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Konfliktvorbeugung und -vermeidung und der nicht-militärischen Konfliktlösungen". In: ôffentliche Anhörung "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Konfliktvorbeugung und -vermeidung und der nicht-militärischen Konfliktlösungen", Protokoll der 97. Sitzung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses am 25. Mai 1994, Protokoll 97, Bonn 1994, p. 98-121. (Albrecht 1994)

Atwood, David C., Nongovernmental Conflict Intervention: some Observations on two current Experiments, in: Calließ/Merkel 1994, p. 171-188. (Atwood 1994)

Belitser, Natalie und Nadir Bekirov, Violent Conflict in the Crimea to be prevented (Part II), in: Calließ/Merkel 1994, p. 286 - 294. (Belitser 1994).

Bercovitch, Jacob, Mediation in der Staatenwelt. Bedingungen für Erfolg oder Scheitern internationaler Vermittlungsbemühungen, p. 89-111 in: Ropers/Debiel 1995. (Bercovitch 1995)

Berghof Forschungszentrum für konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung, Selbstdarstellung o.O.o.J. (1993). (Berghof 1993)

Besemer, Christoph, Mediation. Vermittlung in Konflikten. Königsfeld 1993. (Besemer 1993)

Bewegung und Forschung. Eine Befragung zu den Erwartungen von Friedensbewegung an Friedensforschung, p. 17-19 in: Wissenschaft und Frieden 4/93.

Birkenbach, Hanne-M., Fact-Finding, Gewaltprävention in Estland und Lettland, in: Friedensjahrbuch 1995, München 1994. (Birckenbach 1994a)

Birckenbach, Hanne-M., How do Third Parties actually act? The case of the citizenship conflict in Estonia and Latvia, in: Calließ/Merkel 1994. p. 305-318. (Birckenbach 1994b)

Boulding, Elise, International Nonviolent Peace Teams/Peace Service Newsletter, 5-30-1995. (Boulding 1995)

Bricke, Dieter, Thesen zur Entwicklung einer Minderheitenpolitik in Osteuropa, in: Calließ/Merkel 1994, p. 153-157 (Bricke 1994)

Brock, L. und T. Elliesen, Externe Eingriffe in innerstaatliche Konflikte? Rechtliche und politische Überlegungen, in: Friedensgutachten 1994, Münster 1994. p. 36-47. (Brock/Elliesen 1994)

Buro, Andreas, Friedensbewegung und ethno-soziale Konflikte, Alte Erfahrungen und neue Ansätze, in: Friedensbericht 1994, p. 195-212. (Buro 1994a)

Burton, John and Frank Dukes, Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement und Resolution, St. Martin Press, New York 1990. (Burton/ Dukes 1990)

Büttner, Christian W., Sechzig Jahre Friedensbrigaden - Die unbekannte Geschichte gewaltfreier Friedensstiftung, Gandhi-Information-Zentrum, Schriften zur Gewaltfreiheit, Oktober 1993. (Büttner 1993a)

Büttner, Christian W., Zum Vergleich zwischen militärischem und nicht-militärischem Peacekeeping, p. 29-32 in: "Blau-oliv oder gewaltfrei" (Tagungsdokumentation BSV 1993). (Büttner 1993b)

Büttner, Christian W., Friedensbrigaden: Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung mit gewaltfreien Methoden, Lit-Verlag: Münster 1996. (Büttner 1996)

Calließ, Jörg und Christine M. Merkel, Peaceful Settlement of Conflict - A Task for Civil Society. Loccumer Protokolle 7/93. Loccum 1993. (Calließ/Merkel 1993)

Calließ, Jörg und Christine M. Merkel, Peaceful Settlement of Conflict - A Task for Civil Society. Second International Workshop, March 16 - 18, 1994, Loccumer Protokolle 9/94. Loccum 1994. (Calließ/Merkel 1994)

Czempiel, Ernst Otto, Die Intervention. Politische Notwendigkeit und strategische Möglichkeiten, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 35. Jg. 1994, Heft 3, p. 402-422. (Czempiel 1994)

Debiel, Tobias, Eskalationsträchtige und gewalthaltige Konflikte in Europa, Grundlagenpapier eines Gesprächskreises von AFB und PFK, April 1995.

Debiel, Tobias, Konflikttypologien und Konfliktfaktoren. Schematische Skizze und praktische Anwendung für den KSZERaum, unveröffentlichtes Arbeitspapier, 1995.

Der Überblick. Zeitschrift für Ökumenische Begegnung und internationale Zusammenarbeit. 29. Jg. Hrsg. von der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kirchlicher Entwicklungsdienste. 1/1993, Schwerpunktthema "Wahlbeobachtung", p. 28-52.

Fetherson, A.B., Toward a Theory of Unites Nations Peacekeeping, Peace Research Report No. 31, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, February 1993. (Fetherson 1993)

Fisher, R.J., Third Party Consultation as a method of intergroup conflict resolution. A review of studies, p. 301344 in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Bd. 27, 1983.

Fisher, Ronald J. / Loraleigh Keashly, The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention, p. 2942, in: Journal of Peace Research, Bd. 28, Nr. 1, 1991.

Fisher, Ronald J., Towards a SocialPsychological Model of Intergroup Conflict, p. 109122 in: Conflict and Social Psychology, ed. by Knud p. Larsen, London 1993.

Fisher, Ronald J., Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking, p. 247. In: Peace & Change, Vol. 18, No. 3, Juli 1993. (Fisher 1993)

Fisher, Ronald J., The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution, Springer: New York 1990. (Fisher 1990)

Galtung, Johan, Der Weg ist das Ziel. Hammer: Wuppertal 1987. (Galtung 1987).

Galtung, Johan, Friedensstudien: Frieden und Konflikt, Entwicklung und Kultur. Kurseinheit 2, Fernuniversität Hagen 1993 (Galtung 1993)

Galtung, Johan: Drei Annäherungen an den Frieden: Friedenssicherung, Friedensstiftung, Friedensbewahrung, p. 50-80 in: Galtung, Anders verteidigen, Reinbek 1982. (Galtung 1982)

Galtung, Johan: Strukturelle Gewalt. Reinbek 1975. (Galtung 1975)

Glasl, Friedrich: Konfliktmanagement. Ein Handbuch zur Diagnose und Behandlung von Konflikten für Organisationen und Berater, Bern/ Stuttgart 1990. (Glasl 1990)

Gummersbacher Erklärung "Frieden als Zivilisierungsprojekt", in: Vogt 1995, p. 351.

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Hrsg:), Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung und Gewaltprävention. Beiträge gesellschaftlicher Akteure zur Umsetzung der Agenda for Peace. Dokumentation der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Nr. 8., Köln 1995. (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 1995)

Jongman, A.J., Contemporary Conflicts. A Gobal Survey of High and Lower Intensity Conflicts and Serious Disputes, p. 1421, in: PIOOM Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 1995.

Kempf, Wilhelm, Aggression, Gewalt und Gewaltfreiheit. Diskussionsbeiträge Nr. 30/1995 der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung, Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 1995 (Kempf 1995)

Kempf, Wilhelm, Argumentative Konfliktbearbeitung. In Calließ/Merkel 1994, p. 137-153 (Kempf 1994)

Kempf; Wilhelm u.a. (Hrsg), Gewaltfreie Konfliktlösungen. Asanger:Heidelberg 1993. (Kempf 1993)

Kieler Erklärung, Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung: Eine zentrale Aufgabe für Friedensgestaltung und Friedensforschung, in: Wissenschaft und Frieden 3/ 1994, p. 64.

Kößler, Reinhard und Henning Melber, Chancen internationaler Zivilgesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M. 1993. (Kößler/Melber 1993)

Koppe, Karlheinz, Konfliktprävention, Konfliktregelung, Konfliktbearbeitung mit nichtmilitärischen Mitteln. In Calließ/Merkel 1994, p. 123-130.

Krell, Gerd, Staaten und Bürgerkriege in der Dritten Welt, p. 229-254 in: Einführung in die internationale Politik, M. Knapp u.a. (Hrsg.), München 1990. (Krell 1990)

Kriesberg, Louis, Stuart J. Thorson, Timing the de-escalation of international conflicts, 1991.

Lakey, George, Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolence:How it Works, p. 64-72 in: Nonviolent Action and Social Change, Severyn T. Bruyn und Paula M. Rayman (Ed.), New York, London, Sydney, Toronto 1979. (Lakey 1979)

Lederach, John P., Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Harrisonburg, Eastern Mennonite University, 1994. (Lederach 1994)

Lewer/ Ramsbotham, Something must be done, Bradford 1993. (Lewer/ Ramsbotham 1993)

Matthies, Volker (Hrsg), Vom Krieg zum Frieden. Kriegsbeendigung und Friedenskonsolidierung, Bremen: Edition Themen 1996. (Matthies 1996)

Matthies, Volker , Friedensursachenforschung. Ein vernachlässigtes Forschungsfeld, in: Wissenschaft und Frieden, Bonn, 12. Jahrgang, Heft 2, Juni 1994, S: 45-49. (Matthies 1994a)

Matthies, Volker, Die UNO in Somalia: Operation Enttäuschte Hoffnung, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B 31/94, 5. August 1994. (Matthies 1994)

Matthies, Volker: Immer wieder Krieg? Wie Eindämmen? Beenden? Verhüten? Schutz und Hilfe für die Menschen? Leske + Budrich: Opladen 1994. (Matthies 1994b)

Matthies, Volker: Nicht mehr Krieg und noch nicht Frieden: Der Wiederaufbau von Gesellschaften. In: Der Überblick, Nr 1, 1995, p. 94-97. (Matthies 1995)

Merkel, Christine M., Si vis pacem, para pacem. Zivile Gewaltreduzierung und Streitbeilegung in Ethno-Nationalen Spannungsfeldern. Aufgaben, Konzepte, Instrumente und Institutionen für friedenspolitische Verantwortung in einer veränderten Welt. Gutachten 1994 im Auftrag der Evangelischen Akademie Loccum. Forum Loccum extra. Zivile Konflikttransformation, Evangelische Akademie Loccum o.J. (1995) (Merkel 1995)

Mitchell Christopher R., Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolution, p. 2337, in: Annals AAPSS, 518, 1991.

Mitchell, C.R., The Structure of International Conflict, London 1981. (Mitchell 1981)

Müller, Barbara, Liste und Systematisierung. 29 Fallbeispiele "Gewaltfreien Eingreifens" zwischen 1931 und 1993. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript 1993. (Müller 1993b)

Müller, Barbara, Ziele, Methoden und Wirkungen bisheriger Eingreifversuche. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, 1993. (Müller 1993a)

Müller, Barbara, Passiver Widerstand im Ruhrkampf. Lit: Münster 1995. (Müller 1995)

Müller, Barbara und Christian W. Büttner, Kriegsbeendigung durch gewaltfreie Intervention. In: antimilitarismus information, 25. Jg., Heft 12, Dezember 1995, p. 5-11. (Müller/Büttner 1995)

Nikutta, Randolph, Militärische Konfliktlösung als Selbsttäuschung. Eine Antwort auf Winrich Kühne, in: Friedensbericht 1994, p. 275. 291. (Nikutta 1994)

Paffenholz. Thania, "Die Waffen nieder", p. 57-70 in Matthies, V.: Frieden durch Einmischung, Bonn,Dietz 1993. (Paffenholz 1993)

Ropers, Norbert: Ethno-soziale Konflikte und ihre Bearbeitung durch Drittpartei-Interventionen gesellschaftlicher Träger, in: Friedensbericht 1994, p. 213-230. (Ropers 1994)

Ropers, Norbert, Friedliche Einmischung, Strukturen, Prozesse und Strategien zur konstruktiven Bearbeitung ethnopolitischer Konflikte, Berghof-Report Nr. 1, Berlin 1995. (Ropers 1995)

Ropers, Norbert, Präventive Diplomatie: Neue Ansätze zur Konfliktbearbeitung und zum Menschenrechtsschutz. In Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 1995, p. 85-95. (Ropers 1995b)

Ropers, Norbert und Tobias Debiel (Hrsg), Friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung in der Staaten- und Gesellschaftswelt, Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 1995. (Ropers/Debiel 1995)

Ropers, Norbert und Peter Schlotter, Die KSZE. Multilaterales Konfliktmanagement im weltpolitischen Umbruch. Zukunftsperspektiven und neue Impulse für regionale Friedensstrategien. HSFK-Report 11-12/1992. (Ropers 1992)

Ruloff, Dieter, Geschichtsforschung und Sozialwissenschaft. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zur Wissenschafts- und Forschungskonzeption in Historie und Politologie, München 1984. (Ruloff 1984)

Rupesinghe, Kumar, Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Management in Situations of Internal Conflict: The Role of International NGOs and Humanitarian Agencies, Bericht für die Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 6.6.1994. International Alert. (Rupesinghe 1994)

Ryan, Stephen, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Dartmouth: Aldershot 1990. (Ryan 1990)

Schinkel, Thomas, Projektbeschreibung der Magisterarbeit. Arbeitstitel: Der slowenisch-kroatisch-serbische Konflikt im ehemaligen Jugoslawien und die Rolle Dritter Parteien, o.O.,o.J. (Schinkel)

Schirch, Lisa, Keeping Peace. Exploring civilian alternatives in conflict prevention. Research Report 18, Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala, October 1995. (Schirch 1995)

Schlotter, Peter, Norbert Ropers und Berthold Meyer, Die neue KSZE, Leske und Budrich: Opladen 1994. (Schlotter 1994)

Schmillen, Achim, Nichtmilitärische Konfliktbearbeitung im internationalen System, in: Alternativen, Wissenschaft & Frieden, Dossier 13, Bonn 1993. (Schmillen 1993)

Schweitzer, Christine, On direct nonviolent civilian Intervention, in: Calließ/Merkel 1994, p. 441-444. (Schweitzer 1994)

Senghaas, Dieter, Frieden und Krieg in dieser Zeit. Sechs Thesen, aus: Sicherheit und Frieden, Bd. 11, Heft 3, 1993, p. 159-165. Wiederabgedruckt in: Settlement, Papers. (Senghaas 1993)

Senghaas, Dieter, Wohin driftet die Welt? Frankfurt 1994. (Senghaas 1994)

Stedman, Stephen John, Peacemaking in Civil War. International Mediation in Zimbabwe 19741980, London 1991. (Stedman 1991)

Stille Helfer, 350 Jahre Quäker. Deutsches Historisches Museum Magazin, Heft 15, 6. Jahrgang, 1995/96, p. 11-14. (Helfer 1995)

Truger, Arno, "International Civilian Peace-Keeping and Peace-Building Training Program". Eine weltweit einzigartige Initiative. In: Calließ/Merkel 1994. p. 470-484 (Truger 1994)

Vogt, Wolfgang R. (Hrsg.), Frieden als Zivilisierungsprojekt - Neue Herausforderungen an die Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Baden - Baden: Nomos 1995. (Vogt 1995)

Wehr, Paul, Conflict Regulation, Boulder 1979. (Wehr 1979)

Zartman, William , Negotiations and Prenegotiations in Ethnic Conflict: The Beginning, The Middle, and the Ends, p. 511533, in: J.V. Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, Lexington, New York 1991. (Zartman 1991a)

Zartman, William ,Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change, p. 1022 in: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1991. (Zartman 1991b)

Ziviler Friedensdienst, Ein Konzept des Bundes für Soziale Verteidigung, Minden 1994. (Friedensdienst 1994)

10.2   Case-related literature and source index

10.2.1 Nagaland

Aram, M., Peace in Nagaland. Eight Years Story: 1964-72, Arnold-Heinemann Publishers, New Delhi 1974.

Aßmann, Kerstin, The Naga issue seen from the theory of conflict, Asien, Nr. 53, Okt. 1994, p. 58-63.

Dart, Martha, Marjorie Sykes. Quaker - Gandhian, Sessions Book Trust, New Nallakunta Hyderabad 1993.

Datta, P.p., Roots of insurgency, The North East. A symposium on the problem of a neglectet people and region. Seminar 366, Feb. 1990, p. 46-49.

Hussain, Monirul, The nationality question, The North East. A symposium on the problem of a neglectet people and region. Seminar 366, Feb. 1990, p. 38-45.

Prabhakara, M.p., Fight for autonomy, The North East. A symposium on the problem of a neglectet people and region. Seminar 366, Feb. 1990, p. 50-53.

Sanyu, Visier, Crisis in Naga Politics, The North East. A symposium on the problem of a neglectet people and region. Seminar 366, Feb. 1990, p. 54-56.

Scott, Michael, A Search for Peace and Justice. Reflections of Michael Scott, Rex Collings, London 1980.

Singh, L.P., The Problem, The North East. A symposium on the problem of a neglectet people and region. Seminar 366, Feb. 1990, p. 12-18.

10.2.2 Shanti Sena

Berndt, Hagen, Zur Arbeit der Shanti Sena, p. 41-45 in: "Blau-oliv oder gewaltfrei" (Tagungsdokumentation, BSV 1993).

Desai, Narayan, Towards A NonViolent Revolution, Sarva Seva Shangh Prakashan, Rajghat, 1972.

Schulze, Brigitte, Indischer Nationalismus, in: Wissenschaft und Frieden, 11. Jahrgang, Heft 2, 1993, p. 37-43. (Schulze 1993)

Weber, Thomas, Unarmed Peacekeeping and the Shanti Sena, unpublished PhD 1991, La Trobe Univ. Vict. Australia. (Weber 1991)

10.2.3 Cyprus Resettlement Project

Hare, Paul A.(Ed.), Cyprus Resettlement Project: An Instance of International Peacemaking, Department of Behavioral Sciences BenGurion University, Beer Sheva, February 1984.

Hare, Paul A., Informal Mediation by Private Individuals, p. 52-63 in: Mediation in International Relations, ed. J. Bercovitch u. J.Z. Rubin, 1992. (Hare 1992)

10.2.4 Peace Brigades International Guatemala Project

Buser, Lotti; u.a., Documetation para Los Volontarios/ as de Los Proyectos Centro Americanos, o.O./o.J.

Central America Project Committee, PBI und Bob Siedle Khan, Report on Guatemala Project, Januar 1986 Juni 1987, PBIArchiv, Guatemalaordner, HH.

Central America Project Office, Minutes of the Central America Projects Review., 1820 April, 1986. In PBIArchiv, Guatemalaordner.

Clark, Daniel, Report of the Meeting of the Central Amerika Peace Teams Committee for PBI in Conjunctions With the PBI Conferences on Peace Brigades in Central America, Philadelphia April 22 24.1993, USA, PBI Archiv HH, Guatemalaordner.

Coy, Patrick, What's A Third Party To Do? Nonviolent Protective Accompaniment in Sri Lanka with Peace Brigades International. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, 1994. (Coy 1994)

Eguren, Luis Enrique, International Accompaniment and Protection of Human Rights. Unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, 1994. (Eguren 1994)

Eguren, Euis Enrique und Liam Mahony, International Accopaniment for the Protection of Human Rights: Senarios, Objectives and Strategies, Working Paper 11, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, Verginia 1996. (Eguren/Mahony 1996)

Huffer, Werner, 1. Rundbrief, PBI Büro, Guatemalaordner, vom 17.11.1986.

Huffer, Werner, Peace Brigades International in Guatemala, Versöhnungsbund Rundbrief, Dez. 1987, p. 5455.

Keyes, Gene, Minutes of CONSULTATION on an INTERNATIONAL PEACE BRIGADE held on Grindstone Eiland near Portland, Ontario, 31.08.1981 / 0904., PBI Ordner bei Christian Büttner, Unveröffentlichtes Protokoll.

PBI Team Guatemala, Monthly Overview sept. okt. 1987, PBI Archiv HH, Guatemalaordner.

O.A., Case Statement Peace Brigades International, unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, o.J., o.O.

O.A, Evalutation Report PBI Guateamla, PBI Archiv, Guatemalaordner HH, (o.J.,ca. 1988).

O.A., Nonviolence in Practice 1990 Annual Report, PBI, London 1991.

O.A., Presseerklärung, PBIArchiv, Guatemalaordner, 14.11.1986.

O.A., Bericht aus dem Team, Rundbrief 2/89, Trier 1989 p. 39.

O.A., Guatemala Kein Ende der Gewalt, Rundbrief 12/91, Neuwied 1991.

O.A., Guatemala Aktuell, in: Rundbrief 2/90, Neuwied 1990.

O.A., ohne Titel, Rundbrief 1/89, Trier 1989.

Brief der GAM an PBICouncil,in: Rundbrief 2/89, Trier 1989, p. 31f.

O.A., Guatemala, in: Rundbrief 3/88.

O.A., Guatemala. Neue Regierung neue Gewalt, PBI Rundbrief 9/91: PBI hat Geburtstag: 10 Jahre, Neuwied 1991.

Peace Brigades Interantional, Pessemitteilung wg. Ausweisung von drei Mitgliedern aus Guatmala, UAGuate.wps/20/3/91, PBIArchiv HH, Guatemala Ordner.

Peace Brigades International, Das Friedensprojekt der Peace Brigades International in Guatemala, Infoblatt, o.J., o.O. (ca. 1987).

Sterr, Albert, Guatemala: Lautloser Aufstand im Land der Maya, Köln:ISP, 1994.

10.2.5 Gulf Peace Team

BSV und Barbara Müller, Blau-Oliv oder gewaltfrei, Minden 1993.

Burrowes,Robert J., The Gulf War and the Gulf Peace Team, Social Alternatives, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1991, p. 35-39.

Golf Peace Team, Ein Friedenslager zwischen den Fronten, in: Rothenspieler 1991, p.26.

Gulf Peace Team (GPT), Ziele und Selbstverständnis des Gulf Peace Teams, in: Rothenspieler, p. 26.

IFAG, Abschlußrundbrief der IFAG, Bammental, März 1992, Golfkrieg-Ordner,Archiv Aktiv, HH.

IFAG, Grundlagenpapier, Rundbrief Mai 1991, GolfkriegOrdner,Archiv Aktiv, HH.

IFAG, Rundschreiben an alle UnterstützerInnen, Bammental 12.2.1991, Golfkrieg-Ordner,Archiv Aktiv, HH.

Initiative "Frieden am Golf" (IFAG, Pressemappe, Pressekonferenz, Freitag 1.12.1990. Golfkrieg-Ordner, Archiv Aktiv, HH.

Laubenthal, Ulli IFaG, Rundschreiben, Bammental, 13.6.1991. Golfkrieg-Ordner, Archiv Aktiv, HH.

Laubenthal, Ulli, Rundschreiben an die TeilnehmerInnen des Gulf Peace Team (GPT), Bammental, 1991, Golfkrieg-Ordner, Archiv Aktiv HH.

Martin, Brian, Gulf War shows it's time to set our own agenda, Peace News, July 1991, p. 2.

Medico International, Bericht über den ersten Hilfsgüterkonvoi des GPT, Golfkrieg-Ordner,Archiv Aktiv, HH.

O.A., Jericho to Jerusalem peace pilgrims have to ride, Peace News, May 1991, p. 3.

O.A., The Gulf Peace Team is following up its Jericho-Jerusalem peace pilgrimage, Peace News, Juni 1991.

Rotenspieler, Heinz, Die Vision einer gewaltlosen Friedensarmee: Bürgerdiplomaten in Bagdad 1990/91, Schriftenreihe zur Friedenskunde 6, AngelaHackbarth-Verlag: St. Georgen, 1991.

Sabine Schulz, Brief von Sabine Schulz, Golfkrieg Ordner, Archiv Aktiv, HH.

War Resiters Internationel-Office, WRI Office Report July 1992 for the New York Council Meeting, WRIOrder, Archiv Aktiv 19901992, HH.

Weber, Thomas, From Maude Royden's Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team. An Assessment of Unarmed Interpositionary Peace Forces. In: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1993, p. 45-64. (Weber 1993)

WRI Executiv Commmittee Meeting Brussels, December 1-2, 1990, WRI Ordner, Archiv Aktiv, HH.

WRI Executive Committee Meeting in London, May 9-10, 1992, WRI Ordner, Archiv Aktiv, HH.

WRI Executive Committee Meeting, November 15-17, 1991, WRI Ordner, Archiv Aktiv, HH.

10.2.6 Initiative Frieden am Golf

Fröhlich, Malte und Volker Nick, Brief Bagdad - Auswärtiges Amt v. 15.1.1991, in: Bürgerdiplomaten, p. 50.

Initiative Frieden am Golf, Pressemitteilung der Initiative Frieden am Golf, o.O., o.J. (Dezember 1990), Kopie in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

Initiativgruppe "Frieden am Golf" c/o Clemens Ronnefeldt, Brief v. 7.11.1990 an irakischen Botschafter.

Krauß, Wolfgang, Brief an Außenminister Genscher v. 16.1.1991, in: Bürgerdiplomaten 1991, p. 51.

Laubenthal, Ulrike, Aufruf zu gewaltfreiem Widerstand gegen einen Krieg am Golf, in: Bürgerdiplomaten, p. 32f.

Laubenthal, Ulrike, HansJoachim Lemme, Gregor Böckermann, Ria Makein, Eva Bormann, Maryläne Schultz, Hans Uwland, Kees Koning, John Steel, Ted Arrowsmith, Maurizio Torti, Pagani Giovanno, Bela Bhalin u.a., Offener Brief an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Bagdad, 18.12. 1990, in: Bürgerdiplomaten, p. 36f.).

Liegl, Petra und Wilhelm Kempf, Die Auseinandersetzung mit der bundesdeutschen Friedensbewegung, Kempf, Wilhelm (Hrsg.), Manipulierte Wirklichkeiten. Medienpsychologische Untersuchungen der bundesdeutschen Presseberichterstattung im Golfkrieg, Münster 1994, p. 122139.

Makein, Ria und HansJoachim Lemme, Aus dem Reisebericht von Ria Makein und HansJoachim Lemme, Auszug in: Bürgerdiplomaten, p. 2830.

Müller, Barbara, "Kein Krieg für ôl". Operation Salaam Teil 3, HunsrückForum, Nr. 39, Dez. 1990, p. 46.

Müller, Barbara, "Operation Salaam" Chance für eine gewaltlose Kriegsverhinderung im Golfkonflikt?, HunsrückForum, Nr. 37, Sept. 1990, p. 6f.

Müller, Barbara, Operation Salaam Teil 2, HunsrückForum, Nr.38, Okt. 1990, p. 20f.

O.A., Reader zur Golfkrise. Dokumentation eines Hearings zur Golfkrise am 6./7. September 1990, HG. Die Grünen im Bundestag, Selbstverlag, Bonn, Oktober 1990.

O.A, Unterstützende Gruppen und Organisationen, Kopie in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt, undatiert, vermutlich November 1990.

O.A., O.T., Kopie in Ordner Irak Delegations bei Beate Ronnefeldt. Umdruck Selbstdarstellung Initative Frieden am Golf, o.O., o.J., (Dez. 1990).

O.A., Aufruf, Umdruck, Exemplar in Ordner "Golfkrise/ Krieg" bei Beate Ronnefeldt, ca. September 1990.

O.A., Aufruf zum Aufenthalt im Irak, Kopie, o.O., o.J. (Dez 1990/Jan 1991), in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

O.A., Aufruf zur Begleitung eines gewaltfreien Friedenseinsatzes am Golf durch Gebet und Fasten, Umdruck, in Ordner "Golfkrise/ Krieg" bei Beate Ronnefeldt, um Nov. 1990.

O.A., O.T., Kopie in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt, Ablauf des ersten Besuches in Irak.

O.A., O.T., Kopiervorlage Flugblatt IFAG, ca. Nov. 1990, in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

O.A., O.T., Ordner Irak Delegations bei Beate Ronnefeldt. Umdruck. Beilage der Initiative Frieden am Golf in: "Der kleine Pazifist", Jan. 1991.

O.A., O.T., Rundbrief IFAG, undatiert (Nov. 1990), in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

O.A., Pazifisten in Saddam HusseinOs Bagdad. Fortsetzung der Berichte, in: Bürgerdiplomaten, p. 34f.

O.A., Treffen der Initiative Frieden am Golf 22.24.2.1991 in Bammental, Kopie des Protokolls in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

Ronnefeldt, Beate, Ansprache zur Demonstration gegen den Golfkrieg am 22.12.90 in Lörrach, MS, Redevorlage, in Ordner "Golfkrise/ Krieg" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

Ronnefeldt, Beate, Redebeitrag zur Demonstration "Kein Krieg am Golf Entrüstet Daimler" am 17.11.1990 in Stuttgart, MS, Redevorlage, in Ordner "Golfkrise/ Krieg" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

Rotenspieler, Heinz, Die Vision einer gewaltlosen Friedensarmee: Bürgerdiplomaten in Bagdad 1990/91, Schriftenreihe zur Friedenskunde 6, AngelaHackbarth-Verlag: St. Georgen, 1991.

Ulli, Wolfgang, Conni, Rundbrief an alle Unterstützerinnen und Unterstützer, Bammental, 12.3. 1991, Kopien in Ordner "IFAG" bei Beate Ronnefeldt.

Wolf, Wolfgang, Der Golfkrieg. Eine erste militärpolitische und militärische Auswertung, Bonn 1992.

10.2.7 EMPSA

C.W., Parteinahme und Vermittlung in Südafrika, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23.3. 1994.

Caspers, Ute, Erfahrungen mit Monitoring, Manuskript zur SudanTagung in Hermannsburg 7.5. 1994.

Evenson, John A., Ecumenical OmonitoringO, One World, December 1992, p. 68.

ewm-informationen, ôkumenisches Beobachtungsprogramm in Südafrika (EMPSA), emw-informationen, Nr. 102, Februar 1994.

Germund, Willi, Wahlbeobachter in Südafrika: Bewundert und umstritten, Basler Zeitung, Nr. 92, 21.4. 1994, p. 7.

Grill, Bartholomäus, Unter den wachsamen Augen der Welt, Frankfurter Rundschau, 26.4. 1994, p. 7.

Heinrich, Wolfgang, Begleitung und Beobachtung von Referenten und Wahlen als entwicklungspolitische Aufgabe. Vortrag anläßlich der Auswertung des "Ecumenical Monitoring Programme in South Africa" (EMPSA), Hannover, 1. und 2. Juni 1994, Manuskript.

Kraatz, Nini, Wie sieht die Auswahl und Vorbereitung der Gruppen aus, die sich am Peace Monitoring in Südafrika beteiligen? Welche Voraussetzungen müssen erfüllt sein? Welche Ausbildungswünsche ergeben sich daraus?, Hearing "Ziviler Friedensdienst" Dokumentation der Tagung am 26.2. 1994 im Haus der Kirche (Berlin), Dokumentation 99/94. Evangelisches Bildungswerk Berlin, p. 12-13.

O.A., Church monitors für peace, Challenge Dec 93/ Jan 94, p. 6f.

Reidy, Miriam, Monitoring the violence, One World, July 1993, p. 57.

10.2.8 Mir Sada

agentur, taz, 4.8. 1993, Berlin/Split.

aud, Friedensmarschierer an der Front, FR, 6.8.1993.

Benker, Joseph, Compte-rendu de al visite Ü Sarajevo du 3 au 15 aout 93 dans le cadre de la marche "MIR SADA", Bericht o.O., o.J. (1993).

General Secretariat, Blessed are the Pace-Makers, Permanent Peace Camp at Sarajevo. Guidelines for Participants, o.J. (Frühjahr 1993), Abdruck in Mir-Sada-Akten bei Barbara Müller.

Gulcher, Ernst, Sarajevo 1993. If you do not come back I will come and get you. 29 July-15 August 1993, Bericht, zu beziehen über International Peace Information Service IPIS, Antwerpen 1993.

Hecker, Klaus, Mir Sada-Frieden jetzt, maschschr. Bericht o.O., o.J. (Mainz 1993).

keine, Project: We share one Peace. Si vive una sola pace, Projektbeschreibung Peace Camp, o.O., o.J. (1993). Kopie in Mir-Sada-Akten bei Barbara Müller.

Kelly, Kathy, keiner. Fragebogen zur Mir Sada-Aktion des IFGK, Bericht mit Antwort vom 25.11.1993 in Mir-Sada-Akten bei Barbara Müller.

Kötting, Wilhelm, "Ich bin hier, um nach Sarajevo zu gehen", taz, August 1993.

Lovrenovic, Ivan, Sarajevo stirbt und empfängt Gäste, Die Zeit, Nr. 37, 10. September 1993, p. 58.

Mir Sada, Int. Committee, Mir Sada as one in Sarajevo. On August the 4th, 1993, Flugblatt, Genf, undatiert. Kopie in MirSadaAkten bei Barbara Müller.

Perna, Franco, With Mir Sada in Bosnia, SCIPeace News No. 3, September 1993, p. 1315.

Rathfelder, Erich, Ein glatter Mißerfolg, taz, 5.8.1993.

Rathfelder, Erich, Erste Demonstranten brechen nach Sarajevo auf, taz 5.8. 1993.

Rathfelder, Erich, Kein Frieden bei "Frieden jetzt", taz, August 1993.

Rossig, Rüdiger, Friedensbewegung will nach Sarajevo ziehen, taz, 26.7. 1993.

Tonnis, Laurent und JeanYves Carlen, Bosnie: Mir Sada, une marche pour la paix, Nonviolence actualitÇ, Septembre 1993, p. 10f.

10.2.9 Sjeme Mira

Duckett, Richard, Peace group heads to Bosnia, Telegam & Gazette, Monday, November 29, 1993, in: Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Interview mit Vesna Jankovic, "Es ist nicht nötig, bis an die Front zu gehen", taz, 1.12. 1993. In Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Anne Dietrich.

Lyttle, Bradford, Sjeme Mira, E-mail-Ausdruck v. 15.1.1994. unvollständig. In Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Rohwedder, Jörg, Ist es nötig, bis an die Front zu gehen? Friedensmarsch in Ex-Jugoslawien, DFG-VK Bildungswerke (Hrsg.), Internationale Friedensarbeit-Internationaler Friedensaustausch. Erfahrungen und Experimente. Modellseminare und Praxisbeispiele, 1. Auflage, Dortmund 1994, p. 147- 165.

Rohwedder, Jörg, Sjeme Mira. Gewaltfreie Intervention. Ein Versuch!?, Manuskript, Hamburg 1994. In Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Rossig, Rüdiger (Interview mit Kurt Südmersen), "Es war gut, daß ihr da ward", taz 24.12. 1994.

Rossig, Rüdiger, Friedensaktivisten beziehen Stellung, taz, 1.12.1994, p. 3.

Schaeffer-Duffy, Scott, ohne, Brief Sjeme Mira v. Jan. 1994. In SjemeMiraAkten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Schaeffer-Duffy, Scott, Peacemaking in Bosnia, 4 seitiges Flugblatt, Sjeme Mira, Jan. 1994. In Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Schaeffer-Duffy, Scott, Rev. Michael Morrill, Gary Shapiro, Rev. Stephen Kelly, Badford Lyttle, Kathleen Kelly, Friedenssaat. Ein Vorschlag zum Friedensschaffen in Bosnien, Flugblatt BSV, Minden o.J. (Herbst 1993). In Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Schweitzer, Christine, Mir Sada - Die Geschichte einer mißlungenen gewaltfreien Aktion., Manuskript der Langfassung, o.O., o.J. (1993).

Schweitzer, Christine, Brief BSV v. 31.10. 1993 an die, die sich auf den Aufruf gemeldet haben. In Sjeme-Mira Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

Südmersen, Kurt, Sjeme Mira: Friedensaktion in Mostar, Manuskript.

wam, apc/yugo/antiwar 1.1.1994. In Sjeme-Mira-Akten bei Christine Schweitzer.

10.2.10   Balkan Peace Team - Croatia project: Otvorene Oci

Antiwar Campaign Croatia und Vesna Terselic, Dear Friends,... revised Request, PBI Archiv, Balkan Ornder, BPT, 18.7.1993.

Balkan Peace Team International, Policy Papers of The Balkan Peace Team - International, Minden, November 1995 (BPTI 1995)

Balkan Peace Team International, Progress Report of the Balkan Peace Team in Kosovo/a, Minden, Juli 1995 (BPTI 1995)

Balkan Peace Team: Declaration of Goals and Principles. 1994

BPT, Croatia Proposal, Köln 1994.

BPT, Report of the Meeting, 15th of June 1993 in Paris, PBI-Archiv, Balkan Ordner.

Kuile, Frits ter and Christine Schweitzer, Balkan Peace Team in Kosovo/Kosova, Minden, August 1995.

Otvorene Oci (OtOc), Otvorene Oci Field Report, Part I and II, Zagreb/Split, December 1994.

Otvorene Oci (OtOc), Otvorene Oci Bi-Annual Field Report. An Update to the Report of December 1994, Zagreb/Split, May 1995.

Otvorene Oci (OtOc), Otvorene Oci Bi-Annual Field Report. An Update to the Report of May, 1995, Zagreb/Split, November 1995.

Schweitzer, Christine, Internationale Freiwillige für den Kosovo, PBI Archiv Hamburg, Balkan Ordner: Teil BPT.

Südmersen, Kurt, Menschenrechte schützen - "Balkan Peace Team". Fragen aus einem Projekt, o0.oJ. (Minden, Oktober 1993).

Wildberger, Ueli, BPT: Report of the meeting of the Executive Group in Verona, 19.July 1993, PBI Archiv HH, Balkan-Ordner: BPT.

11   Appendix

Short report of the conference "Nonviolent intervention in crisis and war. Testing the results of research" in the Ev. Akademie Mülheim an der Ruhr from 11-13 October 1996

The event began with a presentation of the results of the research project's work. The focus lay in conveying the model of the conflict pyramid with a conflict spiral and the escalation and de-escalation tracks.

In the subsequent discussion, apart from questions of understanding, points were raised which cropped up repeatedly during the conference.

In particular, how the complexity of a conflict (differences in escalation, many actors and interests) can be made comprehensible through the use of the pyramid.

Very early on the question came up whether the concentration on de-escalation can be justified. Many conflicts are blocked, or such great asymmetries between the parties exist that an escalating intervention without the use of violence may be necessary. What would a description of the nonviolent escalation stages look like?

Doubts were also expressed whether it is sensible to follow UN jargon when naming the peace strategies.

There were also questions about the role and qualification of a third party that results from the model and what relations to the conflict parties look like.

On Saturday morning, after a further input on the "segments of a conflict" and the identification of the actors and their position in society (top/middle/grassroots), discussion began in the working groups on: PBI, BPTI, EMPSA. The working groups attempted to understand the case analysis presented by the moderators and identify further questions. Following this, the case experts had the chance to present their view of the conflict and the project. Together the attempt was made to position this on the pyramid, and then the task was to evaluate the differences from the study's analysis.

Saturday afternoon was characterized by two talks on Chechnya. Dr. Peter Lock from Hamburg represented the theory of a de-limiting of war and privatization of the state monopoly on the use of force. He drew on several points from the complex conflict reality and shed more light on the Russian view of the conflict. Jorgen Johansen (War Resisters' International) first reported on his journey to Chechnya in April 1996 and described the situation there. Both speakers viewed the large number of conflict actors and the economic instability, which the chaos in the Russian army further increases, as being a major problem. As it had taken longer than expected to understand the conflict, the transfer of the conflict to the model had to be postponed until the following morning.

During voluntary discussion and lecture circles on Saturday evening an exchange of individuals' experiences in various conflict areas took place. The evening began with a working group which formed to discuss nonviolent escalation. After that David Hartsough reported on his journey to Kosovo. Finally Peter Steudtner showed a series of slides about the elections in South Africa in 1994.

Sunday morning began with the transfer of the conflict. First the conflict was analyzed, social actors determined and suggestions gathered for options to act that were known from the conflict area. These were sorted according to peace strategy and transferred to the model.

In the closing round many participants said that the conference setting (Akademie, translation) was well suited for a first exchange between research and practice.